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FOREWORD
This manuscript examines the increasingly important form of rivalry and statecraft that has become
known as “gray zone strategies.” In regions from Eastern Europe to the South China Sea, such tactics in the
hands of ambitious regional powers pose a growing
challenge to U.S. and allied interests. This monograph
aims to provide a broad introduction to the issue to
help leaders in the U.S. Army and the wider joint Department of Defense and national security community
better understand this challenge. Dr. Michael Mazarr,
a Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation
and Associate Program Director of the Army’s Arroyo
Center there, defines the issue, examines the most
notable current cases of gray zone strategies, offers
several hypotheses about the nature of this form of
conflict, and suggests a number of policy responses.
The monograph emphasizes that many gray zone
tools and techniques have been employed for centuries. But the analysis rightly contends that such approaches have renewed relevance, both because some
new technologies have made them more effective than
ever and because several major powers are making
extensive use of gray zone campaigns.
We hope that the report will be of interest to audiences throughout the U.S. Army and in the wider
defense community. Many U.S. commands, offices, departments, and services are grappling with
the practical implications of gray zone strategies.
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This research can help inform their understanding of
the challenge and point the way to effective responses.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the remote reaches of the South China Sea in the
Spratly Island chain, China is creating land. In order
to bolster its claims to the waters of the region, Beijing
is pouring millions of metric tons of sand and concrete onto submerged reefs, creating artificial islands.1
Island-building is merely one of the most obvious of
many actions, ranging from propaganda to economic
coercion and swarming fleets of fishing vessels, that
China has been taking to solidify its assertion of
territorial and resource rights throughout the region.2
Step by forceful step, China is laying the groundwork
for a new order in the region that recognizes Beijing’s
unquestioned primacy, and for an international system whose norms and institutions reflect China’s interests and preferences.3 “China is biding its time,” one
report recently concluded, “slowly eroding American
credibility in the region, changing facts on the ground
where it believes it can and carefully calibrating
the coercion of its rivals in the South China Sea.”4
This series of actions is a powerful example of an
approach being used by more and more states with
partial, but still obvious, revisionist intent—that is to
say, states dissatisfied with the status quo and determined to change important aspects of the global distribution of power and influence in their favor. Unwilling to risk major escalation with outright military
adventurism, these actors are employing sequences of
gradual steps to secure strategic leverage. The efforts
remain below thresholds that would generate a powerful U.S. or international response, but nonetheless
are forceful and deliberate, calculated to gain measur-
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able traction over time. In one important sense, they
are classic “salami-slicing” strategies, fortified with a
range of emerging gray area or unconventional techniques—from cyberattacks to information campaigns
to energy diplomacy. They maneuver in the ambiguous no-man’s-land between peace and war, reflecting
the sort of aggressive, persistent, determined campaigns characteristic of warfare but without the overt
use of military force.
China’s use of gradual, multi-instrument strategies
to amass a decisive legal foundation for its claims in
the South China Sea represents the leading example of
this approach.5 But Russia’s recent actions in Eastern
Europe, while employing far more direct action and
violence, also constitute a variety of the tactic. Iran’s
pursuit of nuclear weapons and regional influence
can also be viewed as a variety of gray zone strategy.6
Even the burgeoning diplomatic and economic strategies of such rising powers as Brazil, Turkey, and India
can be seen as much more restrained, but still notable,
examples of gray zone campaigns.
This monograph suggests that large-scale operations in this indistinct landscape will be the dominant
form of state-to-state rivalry in the coming decades.
Henceforth, international rivalry may be characterized largely by such campaigns, which go today by
a confusing array of names—unconventional, hybrid,
gradualist, nonlinear, unrestricted, and more. This
monograph aims to survey these analyses and bring
analytical coherence to the issue.
To be clear, this report does not contend that gray
zone approaches will be the only form of emerging
conflict. As stressed, major combat—traditional warfare—remains possible, though unlikely. Hybrid warfare sits at a different place on the spectrum of conflict
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and is likely to be employed by various combatants.
Rivals can still compete at the low end of the spectrum
through classic diplomacy and covert operations. Gray
zone campaigns therefore reflect only one challenge in
an emerging mosaic of conflict.
Nor does this analysis contend that gray zone tactics
are entirely new. States have been using these kinds of
approaches for centuries, in some ways for millennia.
Concepts such as political destabilization, support
for proxies and militias, information campaigns, and
much more have been a staple of statecraft since the
city states of ancient Greece were vying for influence.
This analysis contends, however, that there are at least
three reasons why we should pay more attention to
gray zone issues. First, a number of leading aggressive
powers—notably China, Russia, and Iran—appear to
be making extensive use of these strategies. Second,
the cost of major aggression has become so severe,
and economic and social interdependence so powerful, that states with some degree of aggressive intent
arguably will be in the market for alternative ways to
achieve their goals. These realities increase the incentive to use gray zone approaches. Finally, while some
gray zone tools have been used since ancient times,
others—such as cyber weapons, advanced forms of
information campaigns, and elaborate civilian tools of
statecraft such as coast guards—are relatively recent
and lend growing intensity to these campaigns. For
all these reasons, a very old and well-established set
of strategic tools has taken on increasing importance.
The concept of gray zone conflict has been increasingly evident in U.S. military writings over the last 2
years. The 2015 National Military Strategy characterizes
the future military environment as a “continuum”
on which many forms of conflict short of major war
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are likely to be a focus of U.S. defense policy.7 At an
April 2015 U.S. Army War College conference, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work argued that
adversaries were increasingly using:
agents, paramilitaries, deception, infiltration, and persistent denial to make those avenues of approach very
hard to detect, operating in what some people have
called ‘the gray zone.’ Now, that’s the zone in which
our ground forces have not traditionally had to operate, but one in which they must now become more
proficient.8

A number of U.S. Army sources, especially in the
special operations community, have given increasing
attention to gray zone issues.9
This monograph argues that three elements—rising revisionist intent, a form of strategic gradualism, and unconventional tools—are creating a new
approach to the pursuit of aggressive aims, a new
standard form of conflict. Evidence from a number of
sources, including ongoing campaigns by China and
Russia, suggests that gradual gray zone strategies
may be becoming the tool of choice for states wanting
to reframe the global order in the 21st century.10 The
idea of competing below the threshold of major war is
hardly new: States and nonstate actors have employed
gray zone approaches for thousands of years, most
ambitiously during World War II and the Cold War.
Nonetheless, this analysis finds reason to believe that
gray zone conflict represents an identifiable and intentional strategy for several states, and a phenomenon of
growing importance. If that hypothesis is valid, then
the United States needs to become adept at operating
in this environment.
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This report represents an initial, exploratory
analysis, one aimed at defining and categorizing the
issue and offering an initial set of plausible conclusions about the phenomenon. It works to distinguish
the concept of gray zone strategies from related notions such as hybrid, nonlinear, and unconventional
warfare. It then lays out seven hypotheses about the
emerging form of conflict, which together can help
bound and define the challenge. The report concludes
with recommendations for U.S. policies, strategies
and capabilities that could help deal with this form of
conflict.
One of its most important themes is that gray zone
strategies carry significant potential costs and limitations. They are not magic wands or panaceas for basic
strategic dilemmas. Though they attempt to remain
under certain thresholds that would trigger escalatory
responses, they tend to generate balancing behavior that cancels out a significant proportion of their
intended results. Even gray zone aggression marks
its authors as threatening and operating outside the
bounds of acceptable behavior in the context of international rules, norms, and institutions. It may slide
under key thresholds, but it cannot escape notice as a
form of aggression. The limitations of such campaigns
mean that an effective response can be mounted, and
the concluding chapter of this monograph suggests an
overall strategy for dealing with such tactics.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1
1. See, for example, Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, “China’s Island
Factory,” BBC Online, September 9, 2014, available from www.bbc.
co.uk/news/special/2014/newsspec_8701/index.html. Carl Thayer has
argued that commentators should not declare that China is “reclaiming land,” which implies a legitimate maritime claim; it is
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creating artificial island with no maritime rights significance, he
argues. See Carl Thayer, “No, China is Not Reclaiming Land in
the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, June 7, 2015.
2. In June 2015, Beijing, China, announced that it would
“complete” its land reclamation project “soon”; see “China to
‘Complete’ South China Sea Land Reclamation,” BBC News, June
16, 2015.
3. There is a lively debate about the true nature of China’s
objectives in the region. The argument here will not portray China
as an unlimited revisionist determined to conquer other states,
or even one with clearly imperialist ambitions. But there seems
a broad consensus that China believes it has a natural right to
geopolitical primacy throughout key regions close to its borders.
See, for example, Gregory Chin and Ramesh Thakur, “Will China
Change the Rules of Global Order?” The Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 33, No. 4, October 2010; Thomas J. Christensen, “Obama and
Asia: Confronting the China Challenge,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.,
94, No. 5, September/October 2015; Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in
Asia, New York: W. W. Norton, 2011; and Adam P. Liff and G.
John Ikenberry, “Racing Toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military
Competition in the Asia Pacific and the Security Dilemma,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 2, Fall 2014.
4. Christopher Yung and Patrick McNulty, “China’s Tailored Coercion and Its Rivals’ Actions and Responses: What the
Numbers Tell Us,” Washington, DC: Center for a New American
Security, January 2015, p. 13.
5. As one analyst has warned, “China’s furtive, incremental
encroachments into neighboring countries’ borderlands . . . have
emerged as a key destabilizing element in the Asian security landscape.” Brahma Chellany, “China’s Salami-Slice Strategy,” Japan
Times, July 25, 2013.
6. “Tehran has proven to be adept at such salami-slicing tactics,” one source has concluded, gradually accumulating elements
of nuclear capacity without crossing any obvious red lines that
would generate a violent answer. Mark Fitzpatrick, “Report on
Iran Nuclear Program: Situation Not Yet Hopeless,” al-Monitor,
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August 31, 2012. The same issue is brought up in terms of a potential Iranian breakout from an agreement, which would not
be, as George Shultz and Henry Kissinger have argued, a clearcut event. More likely it will occur, if it does, via the gradual accumulation of ambiguous evasions” which would pose serious
challenges to U.S. diplomacy. See George P. Shultz and Henry
Kissinger, “The Iran Deal and Its Consequences,” The Wall Street
Journal, April 7, 2015.
7. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of
the United States of America 2015 Washington, DC: Department of
Defense (DoD), June 2015, pp. 3-4.
8. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work, Speech at the
U.S. Army War College Strategy Conference, April 8, 2015, available from www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1930.
9. As just two examples, see Claudette Ruolo, “SOCOM Commander: Success Depends on Total Force Readiness,” DoD News,
March 26, 2015, available from www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.
aspx?id=128461; and Chuck Oldham, “SOCOM: Navigating the
Gray Zone,” Defense Media Network, June 23, 2015, available
from
www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/socom-navigating-thegray-zone/. The U.S. Special Operations Command released a
2014 white paper on “Counter-Unconventional Warfare”; see the
coverage at Robert A. Newson, “Counter-Unconventional Warfare is the Way of the Future. How Can We Get There?” Defense
in Depth Blog, Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations,
October 23, 2014, available from blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2014/10/23/
counter-unconventional-warfare-is-the-way-of-the-future-how-can-weget-there/.
10. Nonstate actors could also make profitable use of gradualist approaches, but this analysis focuses on state actors. The use of
such strategies by nonstate actors could have unique features that
make them best left for a separate treatment.

7

CHAPTER 2
MEASURED REVISIONISM:
THE ENGINE OF GRAY ZONE CAMPAIGNS
In the 2002 version of the National Security Strategy,
the George W. Bush administration suggested that
classic balance-of-power theories of state rivalry had
become obsolete. Because of shared interests in areas
such as trade and counterterrorism, the world’s major powers now had grown to share many interests in
common. More than that, the document argued that
leading powers were converging on a “a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.” It went on:
Today, the international community has the best
chance since the rise of the nation-state in the 17th century to build a world where great powers compete in
peace instead of continually prepare for war. Today,
the world’s great powers find ourselves on the same
side—united by common dangers of terrorist violence
and chaos. The United States will build on these common interests to promote global security. We are also
increasingly united by common values. Russia is in
the midst of a hopeful transition, reaching for its democratic future and a partner in the war on terror. Chinese leaders are discovering that economic freedom is
the only source of national wealth.1

Developments since 2002 suggest that these claims
are only half true. Major powers do share common
interests, and collectively benefit from many aspects
of a rules-based order. Russia profits from integrated
and stable energy markets, China from global trade
accords and free passage of trade. All are threatened by terrorism, piracy, global warming, and other
common dangers.
9

Yet, these mutual interests do not imply that all
major states are satisfied with the existing order. A
number of rising powers are frustrated with current
patterns of influence or goods, or the shape of rules
and norms, and have assembled campaigns to transform that order in service of their interests and values.
Such powers are neither status-quo nor militaristic;
they are both integrated into the world community
and deeply exasperated with it. We might call them
“measured revisionists.”
If world politics were composed solely of statusquo powers, there would be little engine of gray zone
conflict. If it were brimming with bellicose military
predators, then the primary threat would be of traditional combined arms warfare. But an analysis of the
revisionist strategies of key rising powers suggests
that neither of these things is true. Instead, the emerging pattern may be an ambiguous and complex middle ground—a growing number of states determined
to use tools below the threshold of war to shift international rules, norms, distribution of goods, and patterns of authority to their benefit. They are the leading
architects of gray zone campaigns today and likely to
remain so for the foreseeable future.
This analysis is not meant to suggest that only
measured revisionists, or revisionists more generally,
would use gray zone strategies. The United States
and other countries have employed many tools and
techniques characteristic of this form of conflict, from
propaganda to information operations to covert and
proxy operations. But the most persistent and forceful of such strategies will issue from revisionist states,
who have the most urgent motive to force change.
But to be clear, to the degree that gray zone conflict
becomes a more typical pattern in world politics, it
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will be used in ambitious and active ways by a broad
range of actors.
Measured revisionism is not inherently an aggressive or adventuristic viewpoint. It is, in a sense,
entirely natural to the worldview of rising powers.
Such states recognize the value of a rule-based order
and harbor no interest in aggressive wars. But they
are ambitious; they do demand and presume a transformation of some elements of the system; and they
therefore possess a motive to seek out deliberate but
powerful strategies for change.
RECOGNIZING REVISIONISTS
A number of revisionist or dissatisfied powers appear to be in the market for options to transform the
status quo. They are frustrated with various aspects
of their current position—their degree of regional or
global influence, their ability to shape international
rules and institutions to their benefit, the looming authority of U.S. power—and want to engineer a future
international order more of their own design. Such a
mindset can be found not only in China, Russia, and
Iran, but also, in different ways, nations like Brazil,
Turkey, and India.
Scholars and analysts seldom define what they
mean by a revisionist or dissatisfied state, and developing criteria to usefully distinguish status quo from
revisionist actors can be exceptionally difficult.2 Recent U.S. actions, for example, in Afghanistan, Iraq,
Libya, and Syria, and in self-consciously advocating
for democratic revolutions from North Africa to eastern Europe, would meet many of the conditions commonly associated with revisionism. The United States
has rejected or failed to ratify a long list of interna-
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tional accords. In order to pose revisionists against an
“international order,” moreover, that order must be
understood in specific enough terms to know when a
state was trying to undermine it. Just how many elements of the rule-based order a country would need to
oppose to be counted as a revisionist is unclear.
Existing definitions generally point to states that
have some burning reason for overturning major elements of the existing system.3 One scholar defines
revisionists as “states not satisfied with the status
quo and interested in pursuing goals more expansive
than strict defensive-minded security maximization.”
More specifically, revisionism demands “a preference
for changing the international distribution of goods—
including, but not limited to, territory—and a willingness to incur costs in pursuing that preference.”4
Another analyst suggests that “Revisionist states seek
to change the distribution of goods (for example, territory) among the great powers in international relations, while status-quo states prefer to keep things as
they are.”5 In one of the leading recent assessments of
the issue, Randall Schweller argued that “staying in
place is not the primary goal of revisionist states. They
want to increase, not just preserve, their core values
and to improve their position in the system.” As a result, they “must gain relative to others.”6
Beyond this general desire for transformation of
existing power relations, revisionists have often been
viewed as willing to undertake military adventurism.7
The focus on military aggression characterizes the related concept of rogue states, which was discussed
widely as a leading challenge for U.S. foreign policy
in the 1990s. Rogue states, explains one analysis, are
states that “have been effectively labeled as persistent
and/or grave violators of core norms of the interna-

12

tional community.”8 Perhaps the most common definition of rogues involves a combination of support for
terrorism and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction,
usually combined with repression at home.9 Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright gave a 1998 speech in
which she referred to rogues as “those that not only do
not have a part in the international system, but whose
very being involved being outside of it and throwing,
literally, hand grenades inside in order to destroy it.”10
These characteristics, however, go beyond what
I have in mind with the concept of a measured revisionist. This category of states has powerful interests
wrapped up in sustaining most elements of the international system, and much of their behavior fits easily
into the category of “responsible stakeholders” in that
system. They also crave the recognition that comes
from such inclusion—most fear and resent being labeled as the sort of marginal troublemakers implied
by the rogue state category. These characteristics are
critical to understanding the emerging pattern of conflict, because it is precisely in the limited, mixed, and
sometimes paradoxical motives of measured revisionists that we find the basis for gradual, constrained
forms of nonmilitary conflict.
A CHALLENGING CONCEPT
Categories can be as misleading as they are helpful, masking differences between individual states in
the effort to shape them into meaningful groups. In
the context of understanding gray zone conflict, the
notion of measured revisionism can be helpful in describing the origins and engines of such strategies. But
it is important to recognize some of the potential analytical challenges with this category.
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To begin, the very idea of a revisionist state is
likely to embody some degree of imprecision. Dozens
of states seek to “change” the international system in
some way, and it is not clear what precisely a state
needs to do in order to be labeled a “revisionist power.” The significance of their motivations and intentions lies precisely in how much they seek to change
the system, and in what way, but these nuances can be
lost in a generic framework.
It is also difficult to recognize states intent on
changing the international order without a clear definition of that order. George Modelski has offered a
set of potential factors, indicating that states are concerned with several specific aspects of order: Security,
bargaining power, market access, and ability to shape
the rules of the system.11 Designating states as rogues
or renegades presumes some agreed order whose
rules they are violating.12 Some of the ambiguity of
such definitions arises when trying to identify states
interested in transforming the international system:
Just how many specific issues must they attempt to
revise before they count as “revisionists”?
For the purposes of this analysis, I consider states
revisionist if they aim to substantially transform, to
their benefit, significant international rules or norms,
the structure or operating procedures of international organizations, the balance of power or influence among states, or the distribution of international
goods. Revisionists view existing global rules, institutions, norms, and power balances as insufficient to
meet their goals, or unjust, or biased against them, or
some combination of all of these.
Even defined this way, however, it can be difficult
to distinguish revisionism from classic great power
competition. In the realist portrait of world politics,
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states are always jockeying to enhance their relative
power—meaning that they are all dissatisfied with
their present standing to some degree. They aim to
change the distribution of goods and influence in
their favor. From the standpoint of the broader model
being developed here of gray zone rivalry, all great
powers are constantly using a wide range of instruments to enhance their position. Yet, in discussing
the category of rogue or “renegade” states, Miroslav
Nincic suggests that the threat they pose has partly
“supplanted classical power politics as the distinctive
feature of international politics.”13 We will need clear
criteria, then, to distinguish a true revisionist from a
run-of-the-mill, self-interested great power—and to
distinguish day-to-day great power competition from
what could be understood as more elaborate, formalized gray zone conflict.
The idea that rising states typically pick up more
revisionist goals as they become more powerful is also
too simple. As states rise, they gain power to revise
the order, but also, usually, growing interests in stability and predictability. As states become more powerful and developed, they also tend to become more
conservative—they have a greater stake in the system,
and tend to develop domestic interest groups whose
power and prosperity depends on a functioning international order. It is no accident, then, that many
mature states tend to be status-quo states: Once they
have certain capabilities and power, they simply do
not need to revise the system as much. (We can see
this trend, for example, in China’s approach to nonproliferation. For decades, Beijing was resistant to any
controls that would undercut its ability to develop a
deterrent. Once a reliable deterrent was in place, it
embraced a range of international accords.)
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Nor do many discussions speak to the reasons
why states become revisionist. There can be many
such reasons: Pressure from domestic interest groups;
the ambitions and personality of specific leaders; or
state capacity—the idea that states will attempt to revise the system to their benefit when they believe they
have sufficient power to do so. The reasons why states
seek revisionist goals can be all-important in understanding the degree of threat or challenge they pose to
U.S. interests and the international order.
Ideas and ideology play a particularly significant
role in driving the preferences of revisionist states.
Ideological motivations provide one important indicator in distinguishing revisionists from run-of-themill great powers. While great powers are interested
in greater power for generic reasons, true revisionists
tend to act in service of a nationalist vision grounded
in grand narratives. Revisionists are often frustrated
states who believe the international system is biased
against them and possess passionately-held ideas of
their rightful place in the world. Their desire to change
the system comes not merely from a bloodless calculation of relative gains, but from an emotional sense,
grounded in historical myths, that they have been
called by destiny to play a greater role in the world.
DEGREES OF REVISIONISM
It is critical, therefore, to realize that there are different varieties of revisionists, and that the boundaries between revisionism and other typologies of states
are indistinct. There are the extreme cases, David Zionts has explained, like Nazi Germany, which “fail to
moderate even when survival is at stake.” Much more
common, though—and he gives the example of Iran
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during the period of the Iran-Iraq war—are cases of
states which, “while ultimately aiming to avoid selfdestruction will nonetheless persist in revisionist aims
in spite of compelling external factors.” The difference, in other words, is between “those that respond
to failure or other systemic changes by moderating
their revisionism and those that persist.” Zionts refers
to the two categories as “reasonable” and “unreasonable” revisionists.14
Randall Schweller distinguishes four types of
states on the status quo-revisionist spectrum. He describes “lions,” states ready to fight for what they
have but indifferent about taking risk to gain more;
“lambs,” countries hesitant even to defend what they
have; “jackals,” anxious to gain power but obsessed
with preserving what they have and thus risk-averse
even as they are opportunistic; and “wolves,” belligerent predators determined to gain more and willing
to undertake massive risk, “even if losing the gamble
means extinction.” Relaxed about “the fear of loss,
[wolves] are free to pursue reckless expansion.”15
These analogies are only suggestive, but they provide a framework for thinking about the challenge
posed by various states today. By Schweller’s standards, there have been very few true wolves. He provides Hitler’s Germany as an example, and Saddam’s
Iraq may be a modern counterpart, though, even in
that case, Saddam was risk averse in important ways.
A key question for the future is the status of the chief
antagonists to the current system—China, Russia, and
Iran. None of them are close to being a wolf; all are
too risk-averse. But they seem more determinedly revisionist than Schweller’s “jackals,” which are largely
opportunistic rather than calculating.
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There might be room for at least one additional
category of state: States partially satisfied with the
existing system but determined to gain a larger share
of influence within it. These states will be more persistent and calculating in promoting their agenda
than the more opportunistic jackals, but will not rank
anywhere close to wolves in their suicidal urge to
power. They will not merely be on the lookout for
opportunities; they will follow long-term campaigns
designed to enhance their influence relative to others,
and especially to the leading states in the system. But
they will not want to push these efforts to the point
of jeopardizing the entire system, from which they
enjoy regime-sustaining benefits. These would be the
measured revisionists.
Another way of categorizing revisionists is to look
for specific criteria that can be used to locate them on a
spectrum of state behavior. Alastair Iain Johnston has
offered five such criteria to measure revisionist intent
on the part of a state actor.16 They are:
1. Low participation rates in regulatory international institutions.
2. Participation in the institutions without actually
accepting norms.
3. Participation and norm-following, but opportunistic, ventures to change the rules of the game “in
ways that defeat the original purposes of the institution and the community.”
4. An internalized preference for “a radical redistribution of material power in the international system.”
5. Actions to achieve such a redistribution,
especially by military force.
We might add other indicators to Johnston’s helpful list. These could include strength of revisionist ide-
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ology: Is the state or regime built on a narrative that
speaks to a requirement to overturn elements of the
system? Another factor could be resoluteness: Is the
state fully committed to revisionism or is its interest
in changing balances of power episodic and variable?
The role of military force offers another criterion: To
what degree is the state prepared to use military aggression to achieve a redistribution of power? True
revisionists perceive military power as the leading
tool to overturn existing orders and reorient power
relationships.
Figure 2-1 outlines out a typology of regime types
relative to status quo or revisionist orientation. Posing
the types as a spectrum simplifies a more complex relationship of variables, but the typology does convey
some of the basic distinctions involved. For the purposes of this analysis, the category of most interest is
that of measured revisionism—states that do not meet
the classic predatory characteristics of militaristic revisionists, but are nonetheless determined to change
the system in comprehensive ways, beyond the issue-specific desire for reform of what I call “targeted
revisionists.”
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Source: Four of the categories and their characteristics are drawn
from Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the
Revisionist State Back In,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1,
Summer 1994, pp. 100-104.

Figure 2-1. Typologies of State Preference:
Status Quo Versus Revisionist.
By this standard, China, Russia, and Iran would
seem to count as measured revisionists—but so are
a dozen other rising powers determined to capture
more influence. Their interests are not absolute or
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even always very clear, which increases their appetite
for more cautious and gradual approaches as opposed
to risky and urgent ones. Meantime these revisionists
are not uncompromising; they do not seek to bring
down the existing international order, many aspects
of which clearly serve their interests, so much as they
hope to remold, shape, and modify it to enhance their
own standing. Their interests and objectives in these
revisionist campaigns are thus limited.
Within this typology, perhaps the most important
distinctions lie in the middle of the spectrum. Status
quo powers are of little concern, and there are few real
jackals or wolves—and when they exist, they generally spark balancing behavior that mitigates their threat.
Moreover, while such states may use gray zone strategies, it will be in service of larger aggressive aims that
spread into traditional military aggression. Figure 2-2
offers a framework for comparing the more common
types of states.17
Active Status Quo

Targeted Revisionists

Measured Revisionists

Preserve stability and
status quo distribution of power;
reinforce norms and
institutions

Generally preserve status
quo but also change a
small number of specific
aspects of power / goods
distribution

Support many aspects
of rules-based order but
transform international
order in key aspects of
power dynamics and rulesetting influence

Example state / Germany / support
actions
for global economic
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United States / defense
of global order but also
quasi-revisionist support
for democratic revolutions

China / sponsorship of
alternative economic and
regional strategic institutions

Role in global
institutions

Strong though willing
to strike out unilaterally
when pushing on targeted issue of revisionist
intent

Mixed: Strong and supportive role on majority of
rules/norms that benefit
interests; active effort to
subvert norms and institutions in revisionist areas

Basic objective

Strong, supportive,
respect norms and
rules

Figure 2-2. Comparing Moderate Revisionisms.
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Active Status Quo

Targeted Revisionists

Measured Revisionists

Risk
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Limited for actions
that revise elements
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but still constrained
for actions deemed
necessary to respond
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Higher in areas identified as needing change;
limited tolerance for
risk in areas of military
adventurism or outright
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Identity-based
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changing specified elements of system

Significant degree of
frustration about relative
identity, role and degree
of recognition in international system. Impulse
for change comes in part
from grievance over insufficient identity. Stronglyfelt ethno-nationalist
commitment to regional
hegemony and global
influence

Figure 2-2. Comparing Moderate Revisionisms.
(cont.)
MEASURED REVISIONISTS AND
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Measured revisionists therefore represent a strange
hybrid, a largely cautious, conservative state determined to foster a transformation of the international
order. They are determined to revise power relationships but aim to do so without causing general mayhem. They are risk-averse, to a degree, except with
regard to a tiny handful of core vital interests that
would provoke violence. The majority of their actions
may fall squarely into the basket of responsible stakeholders in the global system. As world politics grow
more multipolar and more characterized by regional
and global rivalries, more states seem to be joining
this ambiguous category.
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An especially important characteristic of such revisionists relates to the sources of their motivations.
Despite the lack of an ideological requirement for expansion per se, these are frustrated powers, believing
that they ought to have a more dominant role in world
politics than they do. The range of measured revisionists proposed here is fairly broad, and they will have a
very wide array of types and degrees of frustrations—
Brazil’s sense of grievance, as an example, is nothing
like Russia’s. Nonetheless, in all cases, the national
narratives of these states speak to a glorious destiny
in the community of nations, and they feel that others have not offered sufficient degrees of recognition
or respect. This identity-fueled grievance gives some
of these powers a wary worldview and makes them
less likely to trust in norms, rules, or institutions built
primarily by others.
Nonetheless, even the more aggressive members
of this group are likely to end up as measured revisionists rather than wolves or even jackals. They gain
substantial benefits from the rules-based international
order. They participate in its capital markets, rely on
foreign direct investment and international loans, sell
or buy in global energy markets, ship goods that require stability of sea lanes, produce technologies that
demand reliable standard-setting, and more.
But there is a more subtle way in which many
states, even with revisionist intent, rely on the international system: For recognition, another fuel of
legitimacy. They crave leadership among the global
society of states, even if they believe that some of the
leaders of the current order (specifically the United
States) are hostile to their power and goals. These are
not states, at least in their current guise, prepared to
act in violent contravention of all major global norms.

23

These are not Hitler’s Germany, or Saddam’s Iraq, or
Kim Il-sung’s North Korea. They aspire to middleclass prosperity and global leadership in a modern,
cosmopolitan guise; their identity narratives demand
respect for their place in the world community, not
the subjugation of others.
Measured revisionists, therefore, will strongly
support elements of that order, actively participating
and investing in key institutions, voting at the United
Nations to enforce key norms, working actively to
enforce important rules. They will join diplomatic
or even military coalitions, especially for generallysupported norm-building activities like humanitarian
endeavors or combatting organized crime, piracy or
terrorism. They will crave membership in international fora, host important standard-setting bodies and
Track 2 processes. The complexity of their motives
and behavior derives from the fact that, despite the interests they express with such norm- and institutionreinforcing actions, they remain committed to achieving specific ends that demand a significant change in
existing power structures and rule-setting influence.
I would define these prudent, circumspect measured revisionists as having the following basic
characteristics.
1. They benefit substantially, in some cases decisively, from engagement with the international community, and have little interest in destabilizing world
politics.
2. They gain advantage from participation in international institutions and diplomatic initiatives, and
want to preserve the ability to cooperate with other
leading states when their interests call for collective
problem-solving.
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3. They are nonetheless dissatisfied with the current global balance of power and the U.S./Western
degree of dominance in articulating and enforcing
global norms.
4. They possess historical, cultural, and political motives to see themselves as natural leaders, in
regional as well as global terms, and believe themselves destined and entitled to a certain amount of
hegemony over neighbors.
5. Their current situation, both economic, cultural,
and political, creates a sense of frustrated nationalism that gives their revisionist intent a hard edge and
undermines the potential for trust with other leading
powers, especially the United States.
6. Their pursuit of revisionist aims is constrained
by their inherent conservatism, by the costs of major war (in particular, nuclear escalation risks), and
by their dependence on the system for key national
interests.
Great powers in various periods of history have
shared a number of these characteristics—most centrally, a desire to tilt the playing field of world politics
in their favor without upsetting the playing board altogether. But it is the particular combination of these
characteristics that creates the particular challenge
posed by measured revisionists—states determined to
recast power balances in ways that do not risk major
conflict. Such states are therefore emerging into this
status looking for new techniques to expand their
power. A number of dissatisfied states are actively
looking for means of enhancing their influence without crossing key thresholds that would fundamentally
upset the system. The gradual, unconventional approaches of gray zone strategies are giving them just
such a perceived opportunity.
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CHINA AS MEASURED REVISIONIST
The paradigmatic case of a measured revisionist
today is China. In its identity-fueled ambitions, its
determination to shift aspects of international power,
and its parallel dependence on and commitment to
many elements of the international rules-based order,
China reflects all the paradoxical views and interests
of a measured revisionist. The implication is that
China is neither clearly or solely an aggressor to be
deterred or a “responsible stakeholder” in the international community: It is both at the same time.
The tone of the discussion on China has been
changing over the last year, with increasing emphasis
on Beijing’s aggressive intent. Today many, indeed
perhaps most, observers see China as a more obviously revisionist actor.18 Yet, because of the benefits
it derives from the international system, Alastair Iain
Johnston argued in 2003, China should not be described as a comprehensive revisionist, and his basic
argument remains valid today.19 China has boosted
rather than cut back on its membership in international institutions, and arguably respected many of their
core norms—such as territorial sovereignty and free
trade—as well as or better than many other leading
states.20 In some cases, such as nonproliferation, it has
rigorously enforced many standards and potentially
violated others. The overall portrait is not of a revisionist as much as a state trying to achieve its own
interests within the constraints of the system.
At the same time, in areas where China views a
more direct conflict with its interests, it has rejected the
norms of international institutions in selected ways.
Examples include norms of human rights and military
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transparency, both of which China has strongly resisted. China has shifted from being a relatively passive
participant in various regimes and institutions to a
more active advocate of alternative organizations that
better reflect its leadership, influence, and interests.
An outstanding recent example of this trend is the
new financial institution sponsored by Beijing—the
Asian Infrastructure Development Bank. The United
States urged friends and allies to shun the bank, seeing it as a barely-concealed effort to drain some of
the influence from Western-led institutions like The
World Bank and create a mechanism to allow Beijing
to set the regional terms of development. In any event,
China’s initiative attracted widespread interest even
from outside the region, with countries like Germany
and Brazil requesting admission.21
Jonathan Holslag has argued that China’s international involvement “does not mean that it accepts
the global order.” In its relations with Taiwan, for example, China is committed to a course that demands
that it “profoundly change the international order
and thus the balance of power.” Revisionism does not
demand military aggression, Holslag contends—it is
“merely a desire to change the international order.”
In this sense, he believes that “China has been a revisionist power in a status quo guise,” pursuing a strategy of “revisionism at its best: assiduous and efficient
instead of noisy and antagonistic.”22 Taken together,
this complex pattern of international engagement and
aggressive promotion of alternative norms and institutions marks China as a measured revisionist.
China, of course, is not the only measured revisionist on the scene. Part of the argument here is that
a range of rising powers, all of them responsible and
peaceful members of the world community, will be

27

increasingly viewed in this category. An especially interesting example of this category is Brazil. It reflects
all the major elements of the measured revisionist
category, if in less extreme and urgent ways than its
more aggressive members. Brazil has more moderate
ambitions surely than China or Russia but works to
reform global institutions.23 Brazil’s leading political
class believes that the nation deserves a greater role
in world politics and has been actively seeking reform
of global rules and norms to bring greater equality. Its
aim is to “successfully participate in shaping the rules
and forming the regimes that govern the international
order.”24
CONCLUSION
In sum, then, the international system is becoming
populated with a particular type of revisionist state
likely to be in the market for gray zone strategies.
These states desire a shift in international distributions of power and influence, but are not tempted to
go to war to get them. They are too dissatisfied and
ambitious to do nothing, but too interdependent and,
ultimately, responsible to become a military aggressor
in classic terms. In many cases, they have turned to
gray zone strategies as the cure for this dilemma. A
critical aspect of such strategies, inherent to the compromise such states are making, is that they unfold
gradually, over time.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ADVANTAGES OF PATIENCE:
GRADUALIST CAMPAIGNS FOR ADVANTAGE
The second defining aspect of gray zone conflicts
is the employment of strategic gradualism. Gray
zone campaigns are designed to unfold over time
rather than to gain decisive results all at once. U.S.
foreign policy, always more comfortable and effective when dealing with decisive threats, needs new
habits of thought to deal with this aspect of gray zone
strategies.
Military strategy has often been conceived as a set
of interconnected actions designed to achieve rapid,
decisive results. When the United States sought to
eject Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1990, for example, it coordinated diplomatic, economic, and military
campaigns to achieve that goal in a decisive manner
within a specified time period. In the most general
and common-sense terms, if someone proposes to develop a “strategy” for using force to achieve a goal, the
immediate impression conveyed is one of a short-term
focus. We could call these “conclusive” strategies: The
integration of a range of steps to achieve a decisive
objective in a relatively brief period of time. The U.S.
military’s operational doctrines, as well, are mostly
oriented to winning in the traditional phases of major
combat operations.
But there is another way to approach the pursuit
of national security objectives: Through a long set of
interconnected actions calculated to make gradual
progress.1 Either the interests at stake are less significant, or the risk of escalation is greater, or the actor’s
tools are severely constrained, or some combination
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of all of these factors. Whatever the reason, the result
is that the actor decides that the most effective way
to pursue its long-term ends is not with a conclusive
leap, but instead through a series of modest actions.
One leading purpose of such approaches can be to
avoid the sort of fundamental clash that characterizes
conclusive strategies.
Evaluating the use of gradual approaches to strategy poses analytical difficulties in part because the
idea overlaps with so many existing concepts, each
of which has been defined somewhat differently
over time. Two are especially relevant: “Salami slicing,” and the use of a series of limited faits accompli
designed to sum up to decisive effect.2 Such gradualist approaches may also be attractive to revisionists
today because such concepts tend to align with their
strategic cultures: Chinese and Iranian strategic tradition recommends indirection and avoiding unnecessarily decisive fights where possible. In the strategic
culture of these revisionists, the height of wisdom is
not fighting a decisive, costly battle brilliantly. It is
avoiding the need for such a battle in the first place
while still achieving one’s strategic goals. Step-by-step
gray zone campaigns represent just such an approach.
THE CLASSIC THEORY: SALAMI SLICING
The gradualism I have in mind is closely analogous to the “salami-slicing” strategies discussed in
Thomas Schelling’s classic work, Arms and Influence.
Schelling began his discussion of this concept with
a charming metaphor. “Tell a child not to go in the
water,” he wrote:
and he’ll sit on the bank and submerge his feet; he is
not yet “in” the water. Acquiesce, and he’ll stand up;
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no more of him is in the water than before. Think it
over, and he’ll start wading, not going any deeper;
take a moment to decide whether this is different, and
he’ll go a little deeper, arguing that since he goes back
and forth it all averages out. Pretty soon, we are calling him not to swim out of sight, wondering whatever
happened to all our discipline.3

The problem, Schelling writes, comes from the ambiguity of commitments—the central theme in his discussion of salami slicing tactics. Even a country with
a seemingly iron-clad promise to defend a border is
“unlikely to start a war the first time a few drunken
soldiers from the other side wander across the line
and ‘invade’ our territory.” (In the context of recent
gray zone campaigns, this is exactly the problem that
Ukraine faced with the initial Russian incursions of
clandestine fighters.) Aggressors can thus use “tactics
of erosion,” testing the “seriousness of a commitment
by probing it in a noncommittal way, pretending the
trespass was inadvertent or unauthorized if one meets
resistance.” If the defender fails to respond decisively,
the aggressor has set a precedent, and then moves
rapidly on to the next step in the series. An aggressor
can thus “begin his intrusion on too small a scale to
provoke a reaction,” Schelling explains, “and increase
it by imperceptible degrees, never quite presenting
a sudden, dramatic challenge that would invoke the
committed response.” Through this “steady cumulative pressure,” as Schelling calls it, the aggressor
eventually achieves a dramatic change in the status
quo that—if they tried to bite it off all at once—would
have produced a crisis, or war.4
The point of such tactics, in Schelling’s model, is
very specific—to degrade the credibility of the defender’s deterrent threats. With each move that goes
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unpunished, the likelihood that the defender will respond the next time declines. Incremental approaches,
then, carry the long-term danger of undermining the
potency of promises and policies aimed at deterrence
or reassurance.
An inherent danger in such approaches, as
Schelling recognizes, is that an aggressor will provoke
a violent response inadvertently, doing something it
hopes will pass under the threshold of response, only
to see it spark a massive crisis. The Soviet-North Korean invasion of the South in 1950 is one such example,
an effort to use probing attacks leading to a larger intervention in the thought that the resulting ambiguity would provide the United States with the excuse
it desperately wanted to stay out of the conflict. But
it had the opposite effect, galvanizing not only a direct U.S. response but also a wider surge of defense
spending under the aegis of National Security Council
(NSC) Directive-68. This case illustrates the inherent
danger of a constant stream of gradualist initiatives:
They create an ever-present risk of escalation despite
the desire of the aggressor to avoid them.
FAITS ACCOMPLI
A second relevant concept is the fait accompli, a
quick, limited grab to demonstrate control before anyone can react. Political scientist Daniel Altman has
investigated this particular issue in a fascinating 2015
dissertation that uses the concept as a lens to examine
salami-slicing strategies. Altman views faits accomplis as strategies designed to grab a limited gain before the other side can respond, acting suddenly and
decisively in a manner that poses the defender with
a dilemma of acquiescing or pursuing a dangerous
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escalation. Such strategies target gains small enough
“that the adversary will let it go rather than escalate.”5
Like salami slicing and other gradualist approaches,
of which they can be an example, faits accomplis aim to
confront a defender with a choice between giving in
and risking larger conflict.
They are not signals, because they involve an actual action which is not dependent on an opponent’s
concession and is designed to be nonreversible.
Altman explains that:
Faits accomplis take many forms in addition to seizing territory, including the construction of a nuclear
reactor in violation of red lines from the international
community. Most military operations are not faits accomplis. Military operations which do qualify include
land grabs seizing territory, hostage-rescue raids like
Israel’s 1976 raid on Entebbe, and airstrikes to destroy
weapons of mass destruction sites such as Israel’s 1981
destruction of the Osirak reactor.6

Faits accompli need not be gradual, of course. Indeed, part of their essence is their suddenness; they
are designed to be lightning strikes that achieve their
goals before the defender can react. The key is the
scale. An abrupt invasion that grabs half the land
area of a neighboring state before anyone can respond
could be a fait accompli, but it is far more elaborate
and decisive than would be appropriate for a strategy
of gradualism. On the other hand, the swift appearance of a Chinese outpost on a barren and unoccupied
rock in the South China Sea can be another version
of a fait accompli that would fit snugly into gradualist approaches: A long series of modest faits accompli
that promote objectives over a period of time. In this
regard, Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine stand right
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at the upper bounds of gradualism, and, in fact, some
would argue that they exceed it.
DEFINING STRATEGIC GRADUALISM
Building on the concepts of salami-slicing tactics,
incrementalism, and faits accompli, gray zone campaigns can be characterized by their use of a general
form of “strategic gradualism.” One observer has defined gradualist strategies as involving “the slow accumulation of small changes, none of which in isolation amounts to a casus belli, but which add up over
time to a substantial change in the strategic picture.”7
The goal is often not just to achieve a narrow objective,
but rather to use an avalanche of incremental steps as
the catalysts of an entirely new strategic reality.
Gradualist approaches are especially appealing
to measured revisionists. Such states want to overturn elements of the system without causing general
instability. They tend to be patient enough to take a
piecemeal approach if it will help balance their mixed
goals of transformation and stability. They are more
willing than outright predators to surrender the speed
and absoluteness of conclusive strategies for the more
ambiguous and uncertain, but also less risky and escalatory, incremental approach.
At the higher end of the spectrum, gradualist
strategies range from unconventional war strategies,
proxy conflicts, the covert use of regular militaries,
nuclear saber-rattling, wide-ranging and severe economic sanctions, and large-scale cyber activities, to far
less elaborate activities at the lower end. At the more
elaborate end, gradualist strategies begin to look very
much like more limited conclusive ones: There is no
hard-and-fast line between the two. The primary dis-
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tinction is that gradualist strategies—like all elements
of gray zone campaigns—are chosen specifically to
avoid red lines and escalation, with a clear knowledge
that they must unfold over time.
Gradualist strategies can also be designed to exploit the fissures in partnerships and alliances. The
basic conundrum involved in gradualist challenges is
tough enough for any one strategic actor to deal with.
When the challenge is expanded to several or dozens
of nations in formal or informal alliances or coalitions,
each with its own distinct interests, risk appetite, and
political procedures and complications, the potential
for decisive or even meaningful responses to individual slices of the salami becomes almost negligible.
Dealing with the gradualist approaches of both China
and Russia today demonstrates this difficulty: In both
cases, regional alliances or informal coalitions have
had difficulty coming to consensus on the degree of
threat involved in these incremental moves.
Gradualist approaches also complicate the task of
deterrence and balancing. It becomes harder to recognize when a state is in direct conflict with another,
for example, when conflicts unfold over time and
can be difficult to identify. Such approaches create a
demand for coherent long-term strategy, not merely
a response to each individual event—a particularly
troubling implication for the United States, which is
constitutionally challenged in its ability to sustain coherent long-term efforts. Gradualism also complicates
the cost-benefit calculus for specific policies, because
actions appropriate to a specific imminent action can
be counterproductive in the context of a long-term
campaign.
Gray zone strategies, therefore, will tend to reflect
these aspects of what can be called strategic gradu-
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alism. They will unfold over time, bit by bit, each
step carefully remaining below clear thresholds of
response. Over time, however, the architect of such a
campaign intends for these incremental steps to sum
up to a decisive change in the status quo. Such strategies thus involve measured revisionists acting in a
deliberate and gradual manner to achieve partial revolution in the existing system. We have one major element left to examine—the tools and techniques used
by such actors to build their gray zone campaigns.
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CHAPTER 4
UNCONVENTIONAL TOOLS
The third and final component of gray zone strategies involves the employment of unconventional tools
of statecraft that remain below the threshold of traditional conflict. The use of such tools and techniques is
hardly new. Greek city-states were employing proxy
militias, fifth columnists, and early forms of information warfare several millennia ago.1 During the Cold
War, each side sought to undermine and destabilize
the other without risking major conflict, and the suite
of unconventional warfare (UW) measures became
very elaborate. U.S. and Soviet techniques ranged
from political warfare to propaganda to covert operations of every imaginable type, including support for
guerrilla organizations seeking to undermine allies
and proxies of the opposing superpower. Both sides
developed conceptual frameworks to guide these
often covert tools of statecraft, such as the Western
notion of “measures short of war.”2
States using modern gray area strategies build on
this history by employing a range of tools to promote
their interests and sometimes pursue their measured
revisionist agendas without risking major warfare.
When China sought to gain geostrategic and territorial advantages in the South China Sea, it employed
a wide range of instruments of power. It backed its
claims with historical narratives that spoke to its
rightful mastery of large parts of the region. It approached regional states with offers of economic assistance and other carrots in exchange for cooperation.
It employed civilian fishing fleets to blanket certain
areas and placed oil drilling stations in key locations.
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It used civilian construction companies to create new
land where none had existed, and launched cyberharassment of states that contested its claims.
Iran has wielded a similarly impressive array of
unconventional, gray zone tools to bolster its influence in the Middle East and beyond. It deploys a complex and extensive network of covert operatives and
quasi-military forces through its embassies and other
locations. It uses energy diplomacy and the proceeds
of oil riches to fund its various causes. It has a welldeveloped network of proxies, none more powerful
than the leading hybrid warfare actor in the world—
Hezbollah—to help carry out its strategic ambitions.
It has taken gradual steps to build a residual nuclear
capacity that offers, at a minimum, the potential for
nuclear breakout if it were ever deemed necessary, as
well as general geopolitical leverage.
Such tools have been discussed under the umbrella
of a wide range of potential categories and issues. This
category of tools and techniques has been described
as a form of warfare that is unconventional, gray area,
hybrid, unrestricted, untraditional, and more. Part of
the challenge is to clarify this menu of concepts and,
especially, to be clear about the central issue that is
challenging the international system today. Three
concepts in particular—hybrid warfare, UW, and political warfare—are especially useful in understanding
the role of unconventional and nonmilitary elements
of statecraft in making possible the new emphasis on
gray zone strategies.
HYBRID WARFARE
One leading proponent of this concept, scholar
Frank Hoffman, defines hybrid threats as “Any adversary that simultaneously employs a tailored mix of
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conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and
criminal behavior in the same time and battlespace to
obtain their political objectives.”3 Hybrid conflict, he
suggests, involves the employment of a broad spectrum of tactics and weapons in the same campaign,
the combination of various tools—from high-end military operations to terrorism, criminality, cyberattacks,
insurgency, terrorism, and more—in order to target
an opponent’s vulnerabilities. Hoffman has described
this as “multi-modal” conflict.4 Hybrid warfare, Hoffman continues, is characterized by “states or groups
that select from the whole menu of tactics and technologies and blend them in innovative ways to meet
their own strategic culture, geography, and aims.”5
Defined this way, hybrid warfare would seem to
be a very broad and encompassing concept, more than
expansive enough to include gray zone strategies. Indeed, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has officially used this term to describe Russian actions in
Ukraine.6 Most commonly however, commentators
have used the term “hybrid warfare” to refer to combinations of conventional and unconventional means
designed to produce or lay the groundwork for eventual decisive operations by military forces. It is not a
gray area tactic in itself so much as the appendage of
gray area tactics to major war.7
Hybrid warfare marries conventional military operations, either sequentially or in parallel, to a range of
other tactics largely built around psychological operations and information warfare. The goal is to target the
opinion of publics in states waging war, both to reinforce the commitment of friendly publics and destroy
the morale of adversaries. Most hybrid approaches
also point to strategies that integrate guerrilla and
other irregular operations with conventional ones.8
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The result is a cross-boundary military effort that integrates many different forms of competition and conflict into a cohesive whole. But, again, the purpose of
hybrid warfare is either to win a conclusive campaign
through the use of force and some level or violence, or
else to set the stage for some sort of decisive military
action, perhaps through combined arms operations.
Hybrid warfare is closer to a variety of conventional
warfare than a true alternative to it.
In another article, Hoffman makes clear the limitations of his hybrid concept. “The problem with the
hybrid threats definition,” he wrote:
is that it focuses on combinations of tactics associated
with violence and warfare (except for criminal acts)
but completely fails to capture other non-violent actions. Thus, it does not address instruments including economic and financial acts, subversive political
acts like creating or covertly exploiting trade unions
and NGOs as fronts, or information operations using
false websites and planted newspaper articles. It also
fails to address what a pair of Chinese Army Colonels
discussed in their book titled Unrestricted Warfare (really War without Borders) that was explicitly critical of
Western and American conceptions of war. That concept included diplomatic and financial and information tools as part of a larger conception of warfare.9

Hybrid warfare, then, in Hoffman’s sense, still refers to the employment of tools and techniques of violence to achieve political ends—but tools that mix approaches from forms of types of warfare often thought
distinct, such as decisive action and irregular war.
Such operations overlap with the higher-intensity end
of gray zone conflict as I am defining it, but the hybrid
warfare concept clearly imagines a far more violent
clash that involves direct use of many military instru46

ments. In this sense, hybrid war is truly “war” in a
Clausewitzian sense, whereas gray zone strategies are
a less violent and looser form of conflict.
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
A number of the tactics and techniques being
employed in gray zone strategies overlap with classic UW. The term often is used to apply to a wide
range of activities, but its technical definition refers,
as David Maxwell has made clear, to efforts to support foreign insurgencies. He cites the official Department of Defense (DoD) definition, which characterizes
UW as “activities to enable a resistance movement or
insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power through and with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied
area.”10 A number of early discussions also include
political terrorism in service of insurgent campaigns
in this category.
Greek city-states engaged in long-running campaigns of subversion against each other using all manner of proxy and insurgent forces, including fomenting slave rebellions. The Romans made extensive use
of UW in connection with hundreds of proxy forces
throughout its empire.11 In the modern era, UW perhaps reached its heyday in World War II and the Cold
War that followed. Such operations were common in
World War II, as in Allied operations to disrupt the
German occupation of Yugoslavia.12 During the Cold
War, Moscow employed a range of UW strategies in
various theaters as part of its general approach to subversion.13 The United States and its allies used UW just
as energetically to undermine Communist rule from
Afghanistan to Eastern Europe.
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The concept of UW is making a comeback in a context where major powers desire to avoid direct confrontation, while engaging in competition and rivalry
over important but ultimately secondary interests. In
both Afghanistan and Iraq, senior leaders in DoD—
both within the policy process and to the general public—advertised the operations as UW campaigns, involving U.S. support for local proxies more than direct
application of U.S. conventional military might.14 Russia’s gray zone strategies in the Caucasus and Eastern
Europe have also made liberal use of guerrilla tactics
and local proxy forces.
POLITICAL WARFARE
A closely related category is sometimes referred
to as “political warfare.” It involves measures to promote fragmentation and instability on the home front
or within the military of an opposing power. Some recent descriptions of gray zone forms of conflict have
employed the term “political warfare” to describe
some of what has taken place in Eastern Europe and
elsewhere: Russia’s cyber campaign against Estonia
in 2007, for example, was designed in part to convey
political messages about the inability of Estonia’s government to safeguard its citizens.
In one sense, all of gray zone conflict represents a
form of political warfare. Its goal is to employ a range
of tools of statecraft to achieve specific political objectives. Its activities are integrated tightly into political
realities and dynamics, and it can only work if it succeeds in molding political realities and perceptions in
the intended way. Gray zone conflict, then, is political
warfare to a great degree. But there are specific ways
in which the more directly politically-oriented tools
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of such campaigns can be understood as a discrete
category of effort.
George F. Kennan’s famous invocation of “measures short of war” laid out a range of diplomatic, political, economic, and other aspects of broad national
security strategy. During the Cold War, the Soviet
Union employed what it called “active measures,”
political, economic, and social subversion designed
to weaken the West and clear the way for the victory
of socialism. The key difference was that these measures would be used consistently to work out rivalry
between “great centers of power and ideology in this
world”—measures used for the “promulgation of
power.”15 Kennan was discussing a context of persistent competition, rather than one in which states could
resolve their disputes and move on to another issue.
“Political warfare,” Kennan argued, “is the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace.”
In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short
of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such
overt actions as political alliances, economic measures
(as ERP—the Marshall Plan), and “white” propaganda
to such covert operations as clandestine support of
“friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological
warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.”16

The strategic coherence of U.S. Cold War political
warfare can be exaggerated,17 but the approach was
certainly at the center of both U.S. and Soviet Cold
War strategies. The reason, moreover, was somewhat
similar to the basis for the current surge in interest—
the desire to avoid direct confrontation.
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The primary importance of political warfare today
is in terms of integrated strategies bringing together
information operations, development aid, regime
support, and other nonviolent options to encourage
specific political outcomes. Some have argued for
a political warfare concept at the heart of the global
contest with violent extremism.18 China has arguably
been waging versions of political warfare in its campaigns for influence in Africa and Asia.
CONCLUSION
These three concepts give some flavor of the sort
of unconventional, cross-boundary set of tools and
techniques that can be employed in gray zone conflict.
They can be integrated into holistic, gradual campaigns to achieve political ends. Such tools appear
to be of particular interest to measured revisionists,
states determined to reframe global balance of power
but equally committed to achieving that goal without
major war and, in fact, without even losing their status as a recognized member of the rules-based international order.
In these ambitions, such powers are aided by the
development of a wide range of gray zone concepts,
approaches, and technologies that provide multiple
avenues to pursue limited revisionist intent without
risking major war. Many of these have been on display in recent years—actions from economic sanctions
and energy diplomacy to cyberattacks to information
operations to generate revisionist narratives to sponsorship of militias and fifth columnists to the aggressive use of nonmilitary forces such as coast guards.
Such tools and techniques are not new. But the sum
total of their effect has become unprecedented, and
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offers peaceful revisionists a meaningful avenue to
their goals without outright conflict.
The combination of these three elements—measured revisionism, strategic gradualism, and unconventional tools and techniques—together account for
the origins and character of gray zone conflict. The report turns now to a more detailed assessment of that
concept.
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CHAPTER 5
UNDERSTANDING GRAY ZONE CONFLICT
Gray zone conflict therefore reflects the collision of
three major trends in world politics: The limited but
nonetheless transformative intentions of measured revisionists; the reliance on incremental approaches to
revise elements of the system one bite at a time; and
the employment of nontraditional tools of statecraft to
achieve gradual but decisive results in the no-man’sland between peace and war. The result is a pattern of
state rivalry that can substitute for traditional military
aggression, and which can pose serious challenges to
U.S. strategy.
At the same time, however, there are powerful
constraints on the effectiveness of these approaches,
and they can easily become counterproductive. As we
will see, as much as gray zone strategies attempt to
escape significant retaliation by staying “under the
radar” of key thresholds, they do not always succeed.
Both China and Russia have prompted serious blowback with their gray zone efforts. There may be a real
dilemma at the core of such strategies: They can either
avoid meaningful response or achieve significant and
timely results, but they have difficulty doing both.
THE MOTIVE: THE RISKS OF MAJOR WAR,
AND RELATIVE WEAKNESS
The growing importance of gray zone strategies
does not assume that full-scale armed aggression has
become impossible. But the costs of large-scale aggression have become severe while the potential benefits
have declined, and it has simply ceased to be a mean-
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ingful option for nearly all states nearly all the time.1
Warfare between major powers in Europe, Asia, or the
Middle East remains entirely plausible, but, if it occurs, it is likely to emerge through some combination
of accident, miscalculation, and misperception rather
than because of the conscious choice of a national
leadership. The trend is more than theoretical: Extensive recent empirical work indicates that the incidence
and severity of major war has declined significantly
over the last century, and projects that, absent possible
shocks to the system, it is likely to continue to do so.2
This monograph has identified a number of specific reasons why outright aggression will only serve
a state’s interests under exceptionally narrow conditions. Territorial aggression promises to be more
costly than ever before, partly because of the risk of
nuclear escalation but also because of the role of media and the combination of advanced insurgent tactics
and technologies of resistance. The value of aggression has declined at a time when states can acquire
what they need through trade, and when the relative
importance of such territorially-based prizes as minerals and raw materials is not what it once was. Aggressors risk being shunned by the international community and ejected from the economic, technological,
and social networks essential to national prosperity.
Leading interest groups in major states view their
own stakes as bound up with peace and stability and
oppose measures that would threaten those values. Of
course, when an opponent is a nuclear power or allied to one, the risk of national devastation outweighs
any potential advantage that could be gained from
adventurism.3
Yet rivalry, aggression, and frustration with existing distributions of goods and power hardly have dis-
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appeared from the map of world politics. Many states
still view key neighbors with suspicion and even hatred. Security dilemmas remain as real today as they
have been throughout the history of the state system.
Rivalry will continue in different ways, and Nadia
Schadlow has argued for attention to “the space between peace and war” as a critical future trend in
world politics. The battlegrounds in these conflicts
revolve around the information environment and perceptions, and states try to gain the upper hand with
coercive actions short of large-scale military use.4
In the meantime, many states can also be attracted
to gray zone techniques because of their relative weakness. Russian and Chinese gray zone tactics lately have
been interpreted as indications of cunning and influence, when, in fact, they may speak to a fundamental inability to do anything more.5 Russia’s economic
weakness may mean that it simply cannot acquire a
conventional military of sufficient strength to pursue
its regional goals, leaving it to turn to gray zone campaigns as an alternative. Mark Galeotti has pointedly
observed that Russia, “a country with an economy
somewhere between the size of Italy’s and Brazil’s is
seeking to assert a great power international role and
agenda.” He uses the phrase “guerrilla geopolitics”
to characterize the resulting attraction to gray zone
strategies: Russia is trying to punch above its weight,
and shifting to major combat would expose at least
some of its vulnerabilities.6 For China, Russia, Iran,
and others, operating in the gray zone allows them to
dampen the relative power differences between them
and the United States and its allies. In this sense, gray
zone strategies are a form of asymmetric tool, a sort of
multi-instrument insurgency.
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DEFINING GRAY ZONE CONFLICT
In this context, gray zone conflict might be understood as having a number of characteristics. It could
be considered as a form of conflict that:
• 
Pursues political objectives through cohesive,
integrated campaigns;
• Employs mostly nonmilitary or nonkinetic tools;
• Strives to remain under key escalatory or red
line thresholds to avoid outright, conventional
conflict; and,
• 
Moves gradually toward its objectives rather
than seeking conclusive results in a specific
period of time.
An important distinction regarding such means
of conflict is whether states actively and consciously
choose gray zone strategies as an alternative to other
forms of seeking their political objectives. In some
cases, states experimenting with gray zone techniques
are really developing variations on the theme of traditional combat—things like asymmetric war, which
involve open fighting if in irregular ways, or limited
war, which involves outright combat pursued with
mutually-agreed constraints.7 Or they could be using
gray zone campaigns as a prelude to potential warfare, rather than an alternative to it. Relatively weak
states may grab at gray zone tools and techniques,
not because they consider this set of options a unique
and coherent strategic concept, but because they have
no choice. This monograph argues that we see some
evidence that states have indeed embraced gray zone
strategies as a distinct and specific form of conflict, but
that evidence remains inconclusive.
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Figure 5-1 lays out a range of tools and techniques
that can be used to assemble gray-zone campaigns.
These lists are in no way meant to be comprehensive;
they are suggestive and illustrative of the sort of actions available to measured revisionists. These are
tools that in one way or another tend to fit well into
gray zone approaches. None is necessarily designed
to achieve a rapid victory in the sense of the classic use
of military force.
High
End

Economic

Military / Clandestine

Informational

Political

Other

•
•
•

•
•

Nuclear posturing
Movements of
troops, threats
Creation of fait accompli situations
Large-scale covert
actions to weaken
regime
Discrete acts of
violence at key
moments
Use of UW forces
(SOF, covert operators) in direct action
with deniability
Sponsoring large
scale proxy violence

•

•

Support for
domestic
opposition,
exiles, guerrillas,
militias
Major claims in
global forums to
support revisionist intent; urgent
efforts to change
rules, distribution of goods
Conclude formal
alliances
Sign treaties

•

Large-scale exercises
Signaling
Moderate covert
actions for leverage
or specific goals
Sponsoring moderate proxy activities
Expand/revise
military presence in
regions/states

•

Dialogues with
adversary political opposition
Moderate efforts
in international
forums to revise
rules
Establish
regional concerts

•

Cyberharassing,
targeted
cyber
actions

Small-scale covert
actions for modest
goals
Low-level backing
for proxy attacks

•

Use of global
forums to assert
goals on persistent basis
Networks, Track
2 efforts

•

Low-level,
ongoing
cyber
activities

Blockade
Severe sanctions
Energy coercion

•
•
•
•

•
Middle
Ground

•
•

Targeted sectoral denial
Limited sanctions

•
•
•
•
•

Low
End

•
•

Trade policies
Implied
economic
coercion

•
•

•

Major
propaganda
campaigns
Large-scale
deception
and denial to
conceal revisionist intent

•

•
•

•

Develop and
publicize
historical narrative
Moderate
propaganda
campaign

•

General
information
diplomacy

•

•

•

•

Figure 5-1. Gray Zone Tools and Techniques.
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•

Large scale
cyberattacks
Use of
nonmilitary
assets
(coast
guard,
fishing
fleets) to
create de
facto
presence

A given gradualist campaign could involve a
whole mosaic of actions assembled from this broad
menu. The key to a gray zone campaign is not so much
the tools—though by definition they will remain short
of high-intensity conflict—as much as the phased
and incremental way they are employed, and the fact
that the campaign is seeking to achieve political goals
short of major war rather than laying the groundwork
for, or supporting the conduct of, combined-arms
operations.
Such strategies could then involve a range of possible actions, captured in Figure 5-2. These can range
from peacetime cooperation to competition to lowlevel gradualism to moderate to high-level, as in Russia. A number of these approaches could be combined
into an overall campaign, and the intensity can be
modulated depending on the interests at stake or the
risk tolerance of the aggressing state.

Figure 5-2. A Spectrum of Gray Zone Techniques.
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Nuclear weapons can also support gray zone strategies in a number of specific ways. By definition, these
strategies are designed to stay under key thresholds,
to force the choice of escalation onto the defender and
ideally achieve intended political objectives without resort to major combat. In the process, nuclear
weapons can help to insulate gray zone campaigns
by raising the perceived risk of escalation. Russia, for
example, has undertaken many avenues of gray zone
aggression—all the while making explicit reference to
its potential willingness to use nuclear weapons to defend interests it identifies as vital. The effect is to magnify the dangers of escalation for the other side, and
clear the way for Russia’s gray zone actions. Indeed,
a number of strategic capabilities and threats—cyber
and long-range conventional strike as well as nuclear
weapons—can play this role in gray zone campaigns.
OPERATING BELOW THRESHOLDS,
CREATING DILEMMAS
The central strategic concept of gray zone strategies is to confront their targets with a conundrum. Any
one specific act in the chain will have limited stakes,
but responding to it has the potential to escalate and
create a crisis. One source uses the terminology of
salami-slicing gradualism to build an argument that
applies to gray zone strategies more generally:
Policymakers in Washington will be caught in a bind
attempting to apply this military power against an accomplished salami-slicer. If sliced thinly enough, no
one action will be dramatic enough to justify starting
a war. How will a policymaker in Washington justify
drawing a red line in front of a CNOOC oil rig anchoring inside Vietnam’s EEZ [exclusive economic zone],
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or a Chinese frigate chasing off a Philippines survey
ship over Reed Bank, or a Chinese infantry platoon
appearing on a pile of rocks near the Spratly Islands?
When contemplating a grievously costly war with a
major power, such minor events will appear ridiculous as casus belli. Yet when accumulated over time
and space, they could add up to a fundamental change
in the region.8

Despite the risks and complications of responding,
therefore, ignoring the gradual steps allows the aggressor at least in theory to progressively change the
strategic landscape in important ways. Gradual gray
zone tactics are thus designed to place their intended
targets in a no-win position: “It is the rivals of salamislicers who are obligated to eventually draw red lines
and engage in brinkmanship over actions others will
view, in isolation, as trivial and far from constituting
casus belli.”9
A fundamental implication of gray zone campaigns is to blur the dividing line between peace and
war, and between civilian and military endeavors.
They are, in a sense, the use of civilian instruments
to achieve objectives sometimes reserved for military
capabilities. They place all of society at risk and create a sense of ongoing conflict, even if not through the
deployment of traditional military formations to seize
territory. Gray zone campaigns thus continue the tendency of various forms of conflict—terrorism, insurgency, and nuclear threats included—to make civilian
populations a regular target.10
Conflict or War?
Although it is a form of persistent conflict and a
means of achieving state objectives through force,
gray zone conflict can be distinguished from “war62

fare” as classically defined—a distinction that suggests the need for a new theory of gray zone conflict.
In his initial and perhaps most famous definition, for
example, Carl von Clausewitz writes that “War is thus
an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”11
If this were as far as Clausewitz got, gray zone conflict
might qualify as warfare, depending on how one defined “force.” But in many places, Clausewitz clearly
understands war in traditional terms: As military forces applying violence in defined engagements to win a
discrete victory.12 When he does refer to the potential
to defeat an enemy through delaying tactics and the
gradual imposition of costs, he clearly seems to have
in mind violent means of doing so with military forces. More commonly, when referring to the requirements for victory, he speaks of traditional outcomes:
Destroying enemy forces, “disarming” the enemy,
seizing their capital, undermining their will through
the application of violence, all designed to achieve a
decisive victory on the battlefield. When thinking of
war, Clausewitz had in mind what we would consider to be major combat operations: The employment
of military forces to achieve a decisive victory on the
battlefield.
As often as he reminds his readers that war is not
a distinct and separate activity, but merely the “continuation of policy by other means,”13 Clausewitz also
takes pains to stress the ways in which the environment of war is unique. War is a distinctive enterprise
with particular characteristics—violence, fear, passion
and emotion, chance, and friction. Crossing the threshold into a situation of war is a momentous decision
that must be understood as a departure from regular
life, the inauguration of a different context, with different rules and realities.
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In all of these senses, gray zone conflict cannot
be understood as war. It does not usually involve
violence or bloodshed, at least not as its essential
approach. It does not aim at clearly defined engagements, and there is no identifiably distinct battlefield.
It is not conducted primarily by military forces, or, at
a minimum, their activities are nested deeply into a
more integrated campaign directed by civilians.
Gray zone conflict involves the holistic application
of a mosaic of civilian and military tools, short of combat operations, to achieve gradual progress toward political objectives. It therefore does reflect Clausewitz’s
core dictum about war—it is another way of conceiving “the continuation of policy by other means.” But
it reflects such a continuation through a very different
approach than Clausewitz would have understood as
warfare. It is a distinct form of the use of force—social,
economic, political, and informational as well as military force—to achieve objectives.14 It creates a blended
version of conflict by blurring the boundary between
peace and war, and civilian and military tools and
categories.
One might think that Sun Tzu, the military theorist often contrasted with Clausewitz, would offer a
concept of conflict more aligned to gray zone efforts.
But, in fact, Sun Tzu understands war, ultimately, in
much the same way as Clausewitz does—as the use
of military forces in engagements for the purposes
of decisive victory. The Art of War speaks in terms
of the use of armies, “troops,” force, and violence to
gain territory and crush adversary forces. It argues
that generals work best when left alone by political
leaders, hardly a recipe for an integrated civil-military
campaign. It demands speed, and has little tolerance
for gradual operations. “We have not yet seen a clever
operation that was prolonged.”15
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Some might find support for gray zone approaches
in Sun Tzu’s well-known injunction that winning battles is not the key to success: “To subdue the enemy
without fighting is the acme of skill.” But Sun Tzu’s
dominant view, as illustrated in dozens of comments
throughout the work, is that this is achieved by maneuvering and placement of armed forces, deception,
some degree of clandestine operations—to “defeat
their strategy” as Sun Tzu urges—rather than through
operations lower on the spectrum of force. It is an
army that is taking these actions, not a range of civilian
capabilities.16 Avoiding battle is about using military
strategy to affect enemy perceptions in the context of
a face-off of military force.
From the standpoint of classic military theory,
then, gray zone conflict does not meet the traditional
criteria for warfare. Its character and challenge will be
specific to its nature, and must be thought of differently than war itself. This fact has a number of implications. One is that the principles governing the conduct
of conventional warfare need to be modified, and in
some cases abandoned, when conceiving of a doctrine
for gray zone conflict.
A second and equally important implication has to
do with the legal implications of gray zone conflict.
The United Nations (UN) Charter prohibits “armed
attack” on a neighbor, in service of UN overarching
goal of preventing “breaches of the peace.” Because
they do not reflect unambiguous use of force, gray
zone techniques can create significant challenges from
an international legal standpoint. It is not clear, for
example, whether these coercive and often aggressive actions meet the standard of “armed attack” and
therefore allow retaliatory action under Article 51’s
guarantee of self-defense. In a controversial 1985 deci-
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sion, the International Court of Justice ruled that Nicaraguan meddling in El Salvador did not generate a
self-defense situation, and held that U.S. support for
the contras violated international law.17 One goal of
gray zone strategies is to remain below this particular
threshold and thus not furnish defending states with
a rationale for retaliation that is legal under international law.
States engaged in gray zone conflicts, therefore,
are not technically “at war.” The permissions and
protections of many international agreements that reference wartime, from the UN Charter to the Geneva
Conventions, do not apply to gray zone contexts. The
last 15 years have been a continual reminder of the
great challenges of conducting quasi-wartime activities in a context that does not, in many critical ways,
qualify as war. Because gray zone conflicts can last for
years—perhaps even decades—exceptions to normal
social or political norms will be much more challenging to sustain. As they do with the political context,
then, gray zone campaigns create a vague, ambiguous
environment for legal standards and judgment.
A third challenge is that, in a gray zone conflict,
it can be difficult or impossible to define “victory.”
The goals of traditional warfare are typically clear,
the definition of success or victory is self-evident, and
once one side has “won,” it is obvious to everyone. In
gray zone campaigns, however, a clear concept of victory can be elusive. For China, the day when all other
regional powers accede to Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over key components of the South China Sea
would represent an unambiguous signal of victory.
But such a day, in such unequivocal terms, is never
likely to arrive: There will be no “surrender ceremony” with other states signing a document abandoning
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their claims. Instead, the campaign is likely to persist
for years, generating occasionally clear advances,
frequent reversals, and no final objective outcomes.
The same will be true for the United States and allied
responses to such campaigns.
We can already see the challenges of waging such
conflicts for U.S. and friendly democratic states. Such
societies are more comfortable with simple, traditional conflicts with well-defined objectives, a defined
time frame, and a clear winner. Operating a changing, ambiguous, long-term campaign challenges the
strategic personality of democracies. Because so many
elements of gray zone strategies operate in the shadows—secret and clandestine activities—running such
campaigns can undermine public oversight of foreign
and national security policy.
At the same time, one lesson is that states employing gray zone campaigns may find themselves frustrated in their ability to achieve objectives in measurable
ways. Patience and a measured, long-term approach
are appealing until they fail to generate progress.
Indeed, one lesson of recent and historic experience
may be that gray zone campaigns often simply do not
work, or will be perceived as failing given the political
pressures weighing on national leaderships at critical
moments. They could then set the stage for an escalation if a state views the desired objective as a vital
interest.
Limitations, Constraints, and Dilemmas.
Gray zone strategies are not perfect, and they do
not always achieve the goals laid out for them. In
fact, they can become counterproductive: If pursued
aggressively enough, they will generate some of the
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same backlash and counterbalancing as traditional
military campaigns. When considering the potential
danger posed by such tactics, it is important to recognize their weaknesses as well as strengths.
To begin with, gray zone strategies simply can
fail to achieve the broader political goals laid out for
them. Unlike traditional military operations, they do
not involve decisive moves to achieve specific outcomes. They creep up on their goals gradually—but
that process can be interrupted or countered. China’s
series of actions in the South China Sea, for example,
can only go so far without the forcible annexation
of certain land masses. It might never prompt other
countries in the region to accept Beijing’s territorial
claims. Gray zone strategies represent a sort of compromise for their authors, generating less risk than
outright aggression but also reflecting a less decisive
form of action and less guarantee of success.
The potential for gray zone progress, moreover,
depends at least partly on the degree to which the
intended targets are able to respond in kind. To the
extent that Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, and other
targets of China’s gray zone efforts build their own
capabilities in these areas—generating counternarratives, using information campaigns to promote their
version of events, deploying expanded civilian maritime capabilities to the area, actively subverting China’s efforts through such means as harassment and
cyber actions—the result could be a gray zone stalemate rather than gradual Chinese progress. Like any
other strategy, efforts in the gray zone can be matched
and countered.
Indeed, in the long-run, if the set of international
norms, rules, and institutions that has been building up since 1945 remains largely intact, the authors
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of aggressive gray zone strategies may be at a disadvantage in such contests. The main advantage of such
approaches is to achieve strategic advantage while
remaining below certain thresholds for response. It
is now clear, however, that gray zone campaigns being undertaken by China, Russia, and Iran are in fact
generating significant concern and reaction—in part
because they are viewed as violating key norms of
conduct widely respected in the world community.
In order to press its gray zone campaign effectively,
for example, China must refuse binding negotiations
to settle its maritime claims in international institutions—it might not get the outcome it wants. In choosing gray zone aggression over formal talks, though,
China identifies itself as an aggressor and a state unwilling to play by the rules of international politics.
There may be something of a dilemma for the architects of gray zone strategies, then, a mirror-image of
the dilemma such strategies try to impose on their victims. It may be that gray zone strategies can be either
powerful enough to achieve real progress, or stealthy
enough to fall so far below thresholds of response
that they generate no effective counteraction—but not
both. If a gray zone strategy is powerful enough to
make real progress toward significant political goals,
it is likely to threaten norms of international conduct,
and thus fail in its central goal of avoiding a meaningful response. This is certainly the pattern we see in
Asia, Europe, and the Middle East today.
This dilemma points to the major risk of gray zone
strategies: That they will reveal their authors as clandestine adventurists and provoke powerful and even
escalatory responses. Many analyses of gray zone strategies seem to assume that states which confront them
cannot or will not take decisive or even meaningful
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steps to respond, that they will be lulled into a sense
of security and fearful that any response will escalate
into conflict. There has been some of this flavor in the
West’s response to Russian gray zone aggression in
Eastern Europe, to be sure, and there is little question
that such techniques do pose a serious challenge for
U.S. and allied national security strategies. But Russia’s actions have prompted serious countermoves, as
have China and Iran’s—from arming alternative proxies to diplomatic campaigns to economic sanctions to
military deployments and exercises.
The risk of escalation, moreover, is ever-present,
and could confront the authors of gray zone strategies
with outcomes for which they are ill-prepared. As we
have seen, gray zone approaches might be properly
understood as strategies of the weak, states that might
theoretically consider more direct military action but
which are not confident of their ability to prevail. Escalation would bring them into a perilous domain, one
with significant dangers of military failure. Gray zone
strategies generate a constant risk of such escalation
by creating an atmosphere of contention and zerosum rivalry and a sense of a state trying to impose its
will through force. They also tend to involve a long
series of provocative, sometimes violent actions which
could spark a larger dispute at any moment: Run-ins
between Chinese and U.S. vessels and aircraft and
the pro-Russian Ukrainian militia’s shoot-down of a
civilian airliner are leading examples of such potential
triggers. Gray zone strategies are not like steady diplomatic campaigns: They are forceful, destabilizing,
and operate constantly on the knife-edge of escalation
to the sort of outright conflict their authors want to
avoid.
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It is also worth noting that gray zone strategies are
not cost-free. Russia’s campaign in Eastern Europe, for
example, must entail significant direct costs: The operational expenses of its major military actions; funds
delivered to proxies; and specific capabilities built for
such campaigns. There is no reliable estimate of the
cost of such a campaign, but it is likely to run into the
billions, creating an opportunity cost of other activities or capabilities foregone. Even more substantially,
both Iran and Russia have faced stiff economic sanctions as a result of their efforts to achieve advantage in
the gray zone: Again, even restrained aggression contravenes international norms and can provoke punishments. By all accounts, these sanctions have done
serious damage to Russian and Iranian economies. Finally, there is the geopolitical cost of being identified
as an aggressor—the cooperation foregone, the potential friends alienated, the counterbalancing provoked.
In sum, then, while gray zone strategies represent a
notable threat to U.S. and allied interests, their potential should not be overestimated. They have important
limits and constraints. Russia and Iran are almost certainly worse off today—economically, geopolitically,
and militarily—because of the costs of and reactions
to their gray zone campaigns. China is already paying
a significant price for its gray zone adventurism. The
following recommendations are designed to build on
this fundamental insight—that gray zone strategies
require their authors to challenge international norms
and can easily generate powerful counter-campaigns
even as they remain under given thresholds. An effective response would build on this reality and use
international norms, rules and institutions as the basis for punishing and deterring would-be gray zone
aggressors.
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THE CHALLENGE TO U.S. STRATEGY
Despite their limitations and risks, carefully developed gray zone strategies pose a serious challenge to
U.S. national security strategy. This is true for a number of reasons. First, U.S. foreign policy tends to be
more comfortable with broad and simple principles—
blunt warnings for specific actions and unconditional
commitments. The U.S. global role, moreover, is most
legitimate when acting in defense of clear norms or
principles that have been unquestionably violated by
some revisionist power. The United States is more often confounded when it confronts ill-defined, seemingly innocuous actions by revisionist challengers
working to furnish themselves with genuine legal and
political validation.
These factors reinforce the basic dilemma that
gradualist approaches are trying to engineer. As Daniel Altman has argued, if deterring the first fait accompli
fails, how do states prevent being taken apart piece by
piece with salami tactics? “Making credible the threat
to retaliate is essential for deterrence, but it is no easy
task when the stakes are limited.”18
From an operational perspective, as well, the U.S.
military tends to focus on the major combat aspects of
campaigns—the “Phase III” component, as it has been
known over the last decade and a half. U.S. operational doctrine, force structure and technologies are
designed and procured in order to prevail once Phase
III kicks off. As has been demonstrated repeatedly in
recent conflicts, the U.S. military tends to assume that
the pre-war and post-war contexts are someone else’s
responsibility. Pre-war actions are generally limited to
“preparing the battlefield,” actions designed strictly
to improve U.S. performance in the main fight.
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Steven Metz has catalogued a number of aspects
of U.S. strategic culture that make it temperamentally
unsuited to fighting gray zone conflicts. “America is
organizationally and psychologically unprepared for
unrestricted warfare,” he has argued:
Washington’s instinct is to compartmentalize the elements of power and apply them in sequence, first
trying diplomacy and phone calls, treating crises as if
they are simply a big misunderstanding. . . . The entire
American strategic culture, ethos and security organization is diametric to unrestricted warfare. The United
States wants its conflicts and security problems to
remain tidily restricted. Its strength is greatest when
there is no political ambiguity or ethical confusion,
and when partners jump on board. This is precisely
why America’s adversaries will not fight this way.19

The United States often appears to display frustration with gray zone strategies, as if they are somehow
violating norms of international conduct. In a way,
they are—gray zone aggressors are seeking to reshape
international norms and meddle with the rule-based
order in ways that the United States will find both
threatening and underhanded. Moreover, the persistence and aggressive character of such actions is characteristic of an era of growing rivalry and competition
among leading powers that runs against the U.S. narrative of leading states with largely aligned interests
seeking stability.
The challenge today is to develop a mindset and
a national security strategy appropriate to an era of
mixed or paradoxical trends. What seems to be emerging is a period of rivalry alongside cooperation on
shared interests, fierce ideological competition alongside a deepening global commitment to basic cosmo-
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politan goals, national strategies that respect the value
of a rule-based order, and yet use gray zone tactics
that threaten elements of that order. All of this points
to the need for complex, nuanced, sometimes contradictory approaches to promote global stability at a
time of growing tension.
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CHAPTER 6
GRAY ZONE CAMPAIGNS IN ACTION:
CHINA AND RUSSIA
This chapter seeks to illustrate the nature of gray
zone strategies by examining two campaigns currently underway—China’s effort to solidify its hegemony in the South China Sea, and Russia’s campaign
to produce dominance in Eastern Europe. The case for
China and Russia’s employment of gray zone strategies remains provisional. The evidence discussed is
suggestive, not conclusive. It is possible that what we
are seeing in both cases is an example of a disconnected series of actions rather than a coherent strategy, or
else an example of something else entirely—such as a
simple clandestine military fait accompli.
In order to evaluate whether these countries are
consciously employing gray zone strategies, the
analysis examines five questions:
1. Would their overall national posture and security strategies embrace such approaches?
2. Do they have identified objectives that require a
shift in the rules-based order?
3. Have they developed, in official or quasi-official places, theories or concepts that support such
strategies?
4. Have any official sources endorsed the idea?
5. Do we see behavior that correlates with gray
zone strategies?
Even a positive answer to all five questions would
not prove that a state has chosen gray zone strategies as
their default approach. This section, however, argues
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that there is sufficient evidence in all five categories
to suggest that there may be a pattern in Chinese and
Russian statecraft, one that deserves further study.
Another question is whether these two actors are
employing comparable strategies, or whether China
and Russia are, in fact, pursuing highly distinct approaches. The analysis suggests that there are enough
similarities that these two campaigns suggest the potential relevance of the gray zone concept. Yet there
are significant differences between the two which
once again illustrate the challenges of categorizing
strategies: Russia’s approach to Georgia and Ukraine
is far more aggressive and militarized than anything
China has yet attempted in the South China Sea. Russian approaches strain the “non-military” criteria for
gray zone campaigns, and could perhaps be just as
easily categorized as paramilitary invasions designed
to achieve a fait accompli. Nonetheless, Russia’s actions meet the basic definitions of gray zone strategies—most importantly, Moscow appears to view its
approach as one restrained enough to avoid triggering
key thresholds.
Figure 6-1 roughly plots the scope of the two campaigns on the spectrum of gray zone activities outlined
in Chapter 5. In each case, the full range of activities
extends to the left and right of the colored boxes—in
particular, the Russian campaign encompasses the political narrative-building on the lower-intensity side of
the scale. Moreover, China’s use of swarming civilian
maritime agencies overlaps to some degree with Russia’s use of paramilitary incursions. The figure reflects
the idea that, while emphasizing different places on
the spectrum, both fall into the broad concept of gray
zone strategies.
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Chinese Gray Zone Campaign

Russian Gray Zone Campaign

Figure 6-1. Chinese and Russian Gray Zone
Strategies.
BEIJING’S GRAY ZONE STRATEGY
A leading example of such an approach has been
China’s pursuit of gray zone revisionism in the South
China Sea. China clearly has some degree of revisionist
goals, satisfying the second criteria suggested earlier.
Beijing desires regional hegemony to gain control of
specific resources and counterbalance, and eventually
replace, U.S. geopolitical preeminence in Asia.1 But
like other measured revisionists, China’s aggression
is strictly bounded. It has no desire to collapse global
economic institutions or create spiraling new regional
instability. It has been more than willing to take patient, decades-long approaches to even vital claims in
the name of preserving a global system amenable to
economic growth and prosperity. It seems well aware
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of the advantages of recognition as a responsible global
actor. For these and other reasons, China has become
a measured revisionist—a state determined to change
aspects of the current system without overturning
it. Its basic national strategic posture would, indeed,
therefore appear to call for something like gray zone
strategies to pursue revisionist goals but do so while
managing risk and preserving stability.2
There are reasons to believe that Chinese conceptions of strategy are inherently attuned to gray zone
approaches. In both official and unofficial statements,
Chinese strategy emphasizes the holistic, multidomain
aspects of even military confrontations, tightly integrating political, diplomatic, informational, and economic elements.3 China tends to favor patient, indirect
approaches if at all possible, a preference grounded in
classic Chinese strategic thought.
In recent years Chinese scholars have issued a
number of theoretical works emphasizing the value of
gray zone strategies. The publication of such concepts
does not necessarily indicate that governments have
adopted them. But a number of factors suggest that
these theories are at least suggestive of state intent:
They have been authored by current or former military officers; they were issued by state-run publishing
sources; and there are numerous related discussions
or publications or official comments that suggest these
ideas have taken root and reflect at least some degree
of official thinking.
The most important example of such gray zone
theorizing in China is the well-known Chinese report
authored by two colonels in the Chinese military entitled “Unrestricted Warfare.”4 It constitutes a vision
of future conflict that breaks down the dividing lines
between civilian and military affairs and between
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peace and war, in a persistent campaign for relative
advantage. The title refers to lack of limits on use of
range of tools to achieve power, not on warfare of extreme violence. “Unrestricted Warfare” contends that
nonmilitary tools are becoming equally prominent
and useful for the achievement of previously military
objectives. Cyberattacks, financial weapons, information attacks—all of these taken together constitute the
future of warfare. The “battlefield is everywhere”—
the very essence of an unrestricted war.
The document is more suggestive than analytical,
throwing out 100 provocations without providing solid empirical examples or operational detail. It is not as
clear as it could be about the line between “unrestricted” and classic warfare, or whether the unrestricted
variety is truly a substitute for major war or only an
adjunct. (At times, for example, the document refers to
a complex jumble of everything—long-range kinetic
strikes alongside cyber operations and financial punishments.) It does not recognize as well as it could that
these techniques are hardly new, and that states have
dipped into the full range of the unrestricted warfare
toolkit over the millennia. But it remains one of the
best portraits of a different way of conceiving conflict
in the gray zone.
Finally, in the Chinese case, we do appear to see
behavior consonant with a state employing a gray
zone strategy for revisionist intent. To achieve its
goals in the South China Sea, China has taken a long
series of actions that have built up a persistent claim
to regional hegemony—a series of steps that would
appear to add up to a coherent gray zone campaign
for competitive advantage. China has employed a
wide range of tools and techniques as part of this campaign.5 It has published detailed political claims to ter-
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ritory within its “nine-dashed line.”6 It has generated
historical narratives and documentation in support of
its claims and stated a determination to resolve disputes to its satisfaction. It has deployed a “staggering
variety and number of civil law enforcement and civilian commercial vessels and aircraft” in swarming and
presence missions throughout the region; indeed it
brought together five distinct civilian maritime agencies into a unified Coast Guard in 2013 to enhance the
mutual collaboration in these forces.7 It has employed
the China National Offshore Oil Corporation for regional coercion, deploying an oil rig near the Paracel
Islands in 2014. It has integrated a range of economic,
diplomatic, and informational steps into a coherent
campaign of influence. Figure 6-2 outlines the range
of tools being employed.
Gray Zone Characteristics

China’s Actions

Pursues political objectives through •
integrated campaigns.
•
•
Employs mostly non-military or
non-kinetic tools.

•

•
•
•

•

Outlined political foundations for claims in South China Sea
(SCS) area. Narrative, propaganda efforts.
Numerous elements in seemingly coordinate campaign:
Maritime, political, economic, military.
Theoretical foundations for integrated non-military approach.
Paramilitary: Deployment of civilian fishing fleets and
aircraft to establish presence in disputed areas, swarm and
overwhelm other claimants’ activities, or reinforce Chinese
presence claims under pressure.
Economic: Offering direct aid or favorable trade deals, signing access agreements or joint development deals, threatening or imposing sanctions.
Energy: Use of oil rigs as presence tools; energy agreements
and aid as inducements.
Diplomatic: Conducting direct coercive diplomacy, working
to undermine cooperative or coalition responses to China’s
actions, engaging in negotiations. Establishing parallel norms
and institutions that preserve basic stability of a rules-based
order but shift influence to Beijing.
Informational: Formal statements, social media campaigns,
publicizing narratives; use of cyber capabilities to gather and
shape information, threaten punitive actions.

Figure 6-2. China’s Gray Zone Campaign.
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Gray Zone Characteristics

China’s Actions

Strives to remain under key escalatory thresholds to avoid outright
warfare.

•

Moves gradually towards its objectives rather than seeking decisive
results in a short period of time.

•

•

•

Seemingly clear intent to remain below thresholds of
response, including UN Charter definition of “aggressive
actions” that trigger self-defense provisions.
Willing to retreat to ease tensions and preserve thresholds.
Long-term, incremental series of steps to achieve strategic
objectives.
Willing to step backwards to ease tensions and preserve the
capability for long-term progress.

Figure 6-2. China’s Gray Zone Campaign. (Cont.)
Beijing has placed these tools and techniques to
work supporting a long series of coercive actions. In
2012, Beijing established a settlement on Woody Island
in the Paracels. In April 2012, it ratcheted up pressure
on Scarborough Reef, and eventually the Philippine
forces had to pull back for lack of resources. In November 2013, it declared an Air Defense Interdiction
Zone (IDIZ) in the East China Sea. It has employed
state-owned institutions like China National Offshore
Oil Corporation to create de facto expectation of administrative control of resources, and deliberately
provoked close-run military engagements with other
powers in the region, especially the United States
and Japan.
Taken as a whole, then, the approach would appear to meet the criteria for the pursuit of revisionist
objectives by the gradual application of gray zone tools
and techniques. As long ago as 2000, Andrew Scobell
referred to China’s emerging use of nonmilitary force
in the region as a “slow-intensity conflict,” a strategy
of moves that tries to “lull the other claimants into believing that no conflict exists.”8 Van Jackson similarly
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has argued that “states that challenge the status quo
are increasingly doing so in ways that are deniable,
by pursuing types of coercion that make attribution
difficult, or that blur the distinction between aggressor and defender.” He calls this “gray-zone coercion.”
China, he suggests:
has engaged in a pattern of assertiveness over territorial claims without directly employing People’s
Liberation Army naval forces, instead relying on nontraditional actors and non-traditional means—fishing
vessels, the Coast Guard, water cannons, construction
crews that build artificial islands in disputed areas,
intrusive but unarmed reconnaissance drones, and
‘sonic devices’ that induce nausea in their targets.9

An important criterion distinguishing gray zone
strategies from standard issue, persistent but uncoordinated great-power competition is some degree of intentionality and design. In order to have some meaningful coherence and standing, a gray zone strategy
must be conceived of as an intentional campaign, with
specific lines of effort and identified (even if somewhat
vague) objectives. It must be deliberately chosen as an
alternative to traditional military operations.
There is evidence that China’s gray zone approach
in the South China Sea is an intentional strategy that
meets these criteria—but it is important to stress that
this is a provisional judgment based on incomplete evidence. Chinese officials, for example, repeatedly have
mentioned gray zone concepts. Major General Zhang
Zhaozhong of China’s People’s Liberation Army has
referred to a “cabbage strategy” for gaining influence—wrapping targeted islands with “concentric
layers of Chinese fishing boats, fishing administration
ships, maritime enforcements ships, and warships.”10
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China appears to coordinate various aspects of its nonmilitary approaches to achieve holistic effect. It calibrates the degree of belligerence to keep the strategy
under thresholds of response, scaling back for a year
or more at a time when regional reactions becomes too
intense.
At the same time, China is investing heavily in the
capacity to wage major warfare. It is buying new generations of ships and aircraft, new tanks, new targeting and precision strike capabilities, and much more.
It has an avowed intention to reach the frontiers of
military technology and development by 2020, and to
achieve various forms of military parity with the United States. Beijing clearly is not neglecting the potential for major conflict, or the value of an increasingly
dominant regional military posture along traditional
lines. Again, the increasing relevance of the gray zone
does not imply that other forms of conflict no longer
demand attention, or that they have become impossible. In fact, China’s emphasis on enhanced capacity
for traditional military operations is not inconsistent
with a gray zone emphasis. But the gray zone is only
one part of the potential spectrum of rivalry and conflict, and must be understood as such.
Gradual, gray zone strategies place the United
States in an uncomfortable position. It will be more difficult to gather regional support for decisive responses
to restrained seemingly nonmilitary moves by China.
The gradualism of the strategy is especially problematic: China has been able to step forward boldly for a
year or more with various provocative actions, then
step back and wage a charm offensive to reset regional
and global perceptions before another push forward.
It is salami slicing its way to the achievement of its
objectives, and at no point does it create a sufficient

87

balancing dynamic to effectively check its activities.
In the process, its strategy may be undermining the
utility of regional strategies that assume or rely upon
conclusive approaches: Elaborate plans for large-scale
conflict, such as the concept of Air Sea Battle, for example, are of little use in counteracting China’s gray
zone gradualism.11
As suggested earlier, gray zone strategies come
with significant costs and limitations, and these have
been evident in China’s campaign in the South China
Sea. One source of cost is budgetary: Although precise
figures are unknown, Beijing is surely paying a significant price for the maritime capabilities, day-to-day
operations, and major construction projects in the region. This creates opportunity cost with other potential expenditures; abandoning the gray zone strategy,
for example, might allow China to invest in additional
military capabilities. Surely the more important cost,
however, is geostrategic. Despite Beijing’s effort to
operate below various thresholds, its ambitious and
aggressive gray zone posturing has provoked a significant reaction throughout the region. Other states are
bolstering their maritime capabilities, coordinating
their responses, and cozying up to the United States.
The region increasingly views China as an imminent
threat and is taking steps to balance Chinese power. In
the long-run, especially if economic powerhouses like
Japan and South Korea join the process, this is not a
contest that China can hope to dominate.
These developments reflect one of the primary
limitations to gray zone strategies, which is evident
in the Chinese case. Such strategies cannot escape the
basic balancing dynamic that emerges when states
seek regional or global hegemony. Gray zone strategies can become counterproductive for their authors
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by provoking such reactions, which make the achievement of regional dominance less rather than more
likely. While gray zone strategies can achieve significant short-term gains, the irony is that their reliance
on long-term, patient, and gradual strategies may be
misplaced. Over the long run, an accumulation of aggressive steps will provoke reactions whether or not
major thresholds are crossed.
RUSSIA AND ITS PERIPHERY
A second leading example of a gray zone strategy
can be found in Russia’s unfolding campaign to dominate Russia’s near abroad and drive wedges between
U.S.-led alliances. These techniques have been in evidence not only in Ukraine over the last year or more,
but also in earlier aggressive moves against Georgia
and Estonia. Even Russia’s energy diplomacy with
Eastern Europe reflects another variant of a gray zone
strategy. These actions represent something more than
classic great power politics, but are designed to avoid
the costs and risks of outright conflict. It is possible
to view them as something more straightforward,
and frankly aggressive, than gray zone strategies—a
preemptive military fait accompli that relies heavily
on conventional military forces, sometimes deployed
in clandestine and deniable ways. Recent battles in
Ukraine have certainly involved force-on-force firefights consistent with major combat operations, and
have produced casualties numbering in the thousands.
But there is significant evidence as outlined in the five
categories, that Moscow consciously has undertaken
gray zone approaches.12
As in the Chinese case and in the Russian case, we
see evidence of quasi-official publications that lay a
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theoretical foundation for such campaigns. There is an
extensive literature on nonlinear war and related issues in Russian publications. Analyst Vladislav Surkov
has discussed the potential for “a future war, which
involves everybody and everything, all aspects of life,
while still remaining elusive in its main contours.”13
Sergei Chekanov and Sergey Bogdanov, writing about
asymmetric war in 2010,14 argued that geopolitical
competition is heating up, and states will be looking
for means to wage competition and conflict. The role
of military force remains important, but the focus is
on the indirect use of military power to achieve decisive ends in which the role of information and other
nonkinetic components becomes more decisive. In a
subsequent essay entitled “The Nature and Content of
a New Generation War,”15 the two authors widen their
scope to include all manner of national tools that can
contribute to a comprehensive campaign. Asymmetry
and indirection take their ultimate forms, with states
employing any mechanism available to them in order
to undermine an adversary’s power. The approach
discards the direct, decisive mindset of conventional
military operations for a more gradual and ambiguous approach that reduces costs and risks.
The defining example of such concepts, however, is an essay by Chief of the Russian General Staff
Valery Gerasimov, laying out what rapidly came to
be termed the “Gerasimov Doctrine” and which has
also become known as “New Generation Warfare.”
The very first line concludes that, “In the 21st century,
we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer
declared and, having begun, proceed according to an
unfamiliar template.” Gerasimov describes a future in
which a wide range of tools can bring a society to its
knees in a matter of days or weeks:
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Of course, it would be easiest of all to say that the events
of the “Arab Spring” are not war and so there are no
lessons for us—military men—to learn. But maybe the
opposite is true—that precisely these events are typical of warfare in the 21st century. In terms of the scale
of the casualties and destruction, the catastrophic social, economic, and political consequences, such newtype conflicts are comparable with the consequences
of any real war. The very ‘rules of war’ have changed.
The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political
and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases,
they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in
their effectiveness.

Military forces merely “supplement” these activities, Gerasimov writes. “Frontal engagements of large
formations of forces at the strategic and operational
level are gradually becoming a thing of the past,” he
concludes. “Long-distance, contactless actions against
the enemy are becoming the main means of achieving
combat and operational goals.”16
States using “unrestricted warfare” strategies or
the approaches laid out by Gerasimov would employ
a wide range of tools—economic, diplomatic, informational, military, and more. In such campaigns, outright military moves are vague or ambiguous; sometimes they are more apparent, but stop well short of
large-scale conventional combined arms combat. The
critical factors are the encompassing, holistic nature
of the campaign and its largely nonmilitary character.
The specific goals can vary, however, and need not always be as elaborate as the ones sketched out by Gerasimov. The campaigns he outlines sound more like a
conventional bombing campaign conducted through
other means—significant impacts through the whole
range of an enemy territory to bring about the end
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of their regime or their surrender on some key issue.
Gray zone campaigns could be used for such objectives, but they can also be employed for much more
limited ends: Gaining leverage on a specific territorial
dispute, for example.
Philip Karber has studied Russian tactics in Ukraine
from the front lines, and argues that Moscow is using
“New Generation Warfare” techniques quite explicitly, using the Ukraine campaign “to both test and perfect
it.” Karber’s account makes clear the challenge in categorizing the Russian approach. From first-hand, frontline reporting, he describes substantial tank battles,
massive artillery duels, and the movement of Russian
conventional forces across the border. At one point, he
uses the phrase “real war.” Yet, he also defines “New
Generation Warfare” in primarily nonmilitary terms:
Political subversion, proxy sanctuary, “intervention”
(but mostly in the form of maneuvering around the
border and limited cross-border firing), coercive
deterrence, and “negotiated manipulation.”17
As in the Chinese case, Russian objectives clearly
have a revisionist cast while desiring to avoid outright conflict—Russia has national interests or goals
that would suggest the need for gray zone revisionism. Russian President Vladimir Putin seeks to renew
Russian dominance of the near abroad, undermine
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and
reduce U.S. influence in the region. He has been trying to coerce the alignment decisions of neighboring
states—Georgia and Ukraine most prominent among
them—by essentially denying their right to throw their
lot with the West. Yet like China, Russia’s revisionism
comes with strict limits. So far at least, Moscow seems
anxious to preserve its standing as a responsible member of the international community.
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We also see behavior that implies the existence
of gray zone strategies. As Figure 6-3 suggests, the
approach has drawn from a shifting array of tools.18
These include coercive diplomacy, economic assistance, threats of energy sanctions, propaganda and
information operations, cyberattacks, sponsorship of
local militias and guerrilla organizations, support for
pro-Moscow political movements, military maneuvers, and implied nuclear threats.19 Further evidence
of Russia’s explicit adoption of gray zone strategies
can be found in the significant investments in the tools
and capabilities to engage in such campaigns. Moscow
has built up various components of its special operating forces, Mark Galeotti notes, providing the capacity for unattributed infiltration as occurred in Ukraine.
It has invested in its intelligence assets, to provide
deep situational awareness for such campaigns. Moscow has expanded its propaganda tools, including
the RT television channel and social media outlets.20
All of this adds up to a significant investment in the
gray zone.
Gray Zone Characteristics

Russia’s Actions

Pursues political objectives through •
integrated campaigns.
•
•

Outlined political objections to NATO/Western policies in
Eastern Europe, basis for Russian claims of hegemony,
territorial claims. Narrative, propaganda efforts.
Numerous elements in a seemingly coordinated campaign:
Propaganda, political subversion, unconventional warfare,
cyber, economic, military.
Uses negotiation process as a cover for campaign. Generates
enemy “violations” of ceasefires and negotiated agreements
to justify actions.

Figure 6-3. Russia’s Gray Zone Campaign.
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Employs mostly non-military or
non-kinetic tools.

•

•

•
•
•
•
•

Strives to remain under key escalatory thresholds to avoid outright
warfare.

•

Paramilitary: Use proxy forces, from paid demonstrators to
friendly militias to plain-clothes special forces, to infiltrate,
cause disruption, eventually seize elements of state authority
in targeted areas. Create proxy sanctuaries to protect allied
forces; control transportation nodes in targeted areas. “Rebrand” own forces, even high-end motorized forces, as local
proxies. At high end use direct military fires to support local
proxies: Artillery, direct action in extreme cases.
Political: Identify socio-political vulnerabilities in target
states, especially ethnonational diasporas. Support separatist
movements. Bribe local political leaders and media figures;
manipulation of targeted and coordinated corruption.
Economic: Sanctions or threat of same, targeted financial
punishments, withdrawal of capital; generating a crisis to
spark capital flight and collapse of FDI.
Energy: Use of energy dependencies for coercive effect.
Diplomatic: General proposals and negotiating positions that
support narrative and objectives; reach out to friendly states,
dampen opposition.
Informational: Formal statements, social media campaigns,
publicizing narratives; employ friendly NGOs in target state to
parrot narrative.
Cyber: Use of cyber capabilities to gather and shape information, threaten punitive actions.
Strategy avoids directly challenging areas of U.S./Western
vital national interests: Crimea vs. Kiev.

Figure 6-3. Russia’s Gray Zone Campaign. (Cont.)
Matthew Kroenig has described this strategy as
“a combination of hybrid warfare and nuclear brinkmanship.” The goal is to use various levels of force
“to make gradual territorial revisions against nearby
NATO members.” Moscow wants to avoid an outright
conventional clash with NATO, and so it uses “hybrid
warfare to make its revisionist actions as subtle as possible, avoiding moves that would trigger an automatic,
robust response.” It employs tactics such as claiming
to rescue Russian nationals, cyberwar, propaganda,
clandestine special operations forces operations especially targeted against government facilities, economic
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sanctions, massing of coercive regular military forces
at the border, all “to make small but meaningful gains
short of outright invasion.”21 In NATO responses, official as well as unofficial, the term “hybrid warfare” has
been widely used to describe these activities—though
as we have seen what these analyses really have in
mind is something closer to the concept of gray zone
conflict.22
As Moscow’s strategy has played out, the limits
and costs of its aggressive gray zone strategy have
become more evident. Lawrence Freedman has pointed out, for example, that the celebrated militias and
fifth-columnists sponsored by Moscow have run into
significant operational difficulties. The somewhat random collection of units and forces drawn together for
the campaign were difficult to coordinate, and some
resisted direction from Russia. It was all well and good
to suggest destabilizing a neighbor, but once the campaign shifted to the traditional sphere, Moscow had to
consider the challenge of occupying parts of a hostile
state. Its efforts to generate false narratives, Freedman reminds us, achieved little in the West, where its
aggression was seen for what it was.23
Russia has paid a tremendous price for its gray
zone adventurism—economic sanctions, political
alienation, and military countermoves. The United
States and a number of NATO allies have been training Ukrainian units, and learning much about Russian
operational art in the process—lessons that could be
put to good use if the conflict were ever to escalate.
Joshua Rovner has ably catalogued the results of
Putin’s gambits:
In the last 2 years, he has all but ruined his aspiration to return Russia to the ranks of the great powers.
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His ham-fisted annexation of Crimea, along with his
transparent support for secessionists in the ongoing
civil war in East Ukraine, has been disastrous for Russian interests. Putin’s adventurism led to stock market
chaos, a major currency crisis, and staggering levels
of capital flight—all of which have compounded the
problem of collapsing oil prices. The loss of revenue
is damaging Russia’s conventional military power because the government will struggle mightily to modernize its forces. Meanwhile, Putin has breathed new
life into NATO, an alliance that had been searching for
common purpose and sagging under the weight of the
war in Afghanistan.24

At the same time, the ongoing conflict has become
a festering drain on resources and national will. If
Moscow’s aim in the use of gray zone tactics was to
avoid significant retaliation, it has failed miserably.
CONCLUSION
There would appear to be sufficient evidence to
suggest, therefore, that both China and Russia have
explicitly chosen gray zone-style strategies to pursue
their measured revisionist goals. As noted earlier, this
claim remains provisional; the evidence is suggestive
but not conclusive. Nonetheless, there is enough to
suggest that the United States and its friends and allies ought to do more to understand the nature of gray
zone conflict. Chapter 7 offers a number of provisional
hypotheses about such conflicts.
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CHAPTER 7
SEVEN HYPOTHESES ON THE GRAY ZONE
In order to understand the essence of the challenge
posed by gray zone conflict, this chapter offers seven
propositions on the character of this tool. These are
offered as hypotheses rather than conclusions because
they remain provisional and suggestive. They represent invitations to delve further into theoretical and
empirical analysis to determine the real challenge
posed by such modes of statecraft.
HYPOTHESIS ONE: GRAY ZONE CAMPAIGNS
WILL CONSTITUTE THE DEFAULT MODE OF
CONFLICT IN COMING DECADES
This hypothesis flows logically from the portrait
of the emerging shape of world politics developed in
the first few chapters of this monograph. If world politics are indeed likely to be characterized by a growing
number of “measured revisionists”; if these measured
revisionists (and others) will be able to rely on gradual, incremental approaches to achieving their interests
and goals; and if they have at their disposal a growing array of nontraditional tools other than classic
military force to conduct those efforts, then gray zone
strategies stand to become the default means of global
competition. The potential for traditional major conflict will remain ever-present, but largely as a result of
misperception, miscommunication or accident rather
than as the purposeful strategy of a major power.
There is strong reason to believe that the coming
decades are likely to witness growing tension and
rivalry in international politics. This is a function of
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the growing proportion of revisionism within the
preferences and desires of major powers. But it may
also stem from the more general multipolarity of the
emerging system, in which a larger number of rising
powers, whether truly revisionist or not, will be jostle
for influence and power. At the same time, continued
economic challenges and other factors are helping to
fuel aggressive ethno-nationalism in many emerging
countries, exacerbating the underlying sense of grievance, suspicion and rivalry in the system.
The upshot of such trends is that we can expect the
next 2-plus decades to be a time of burgeoning competition. But it will also be a time when most states
recognize that their vital interests, including national
prosperity and the security of the governing regimes,
rely to a significant degree on the economic, diplomatic, and military benefits of participation in some
version of a rules-based order. The emerging pattern,
already well in evidence, would seem to be a sort of
constrained or measured rivalry, and gray zone strategies represent a leading adaptation to such a context.
“Every age had its own kind of war,” Clausewitz argued1—and in the coming decades, the sort of warfare, or conflict, most appropriate to the context could
be one that allows major powers to compete short of
the threshold of major war.
As suggested earlier, though, this hypothesis does
not imply that major war has become “impossible.”
The evidence supports a proposition that the conscious choices of responsible state leadership would
seldom, if ever, find reason to engage in large-scale
conflict, and would prefer to operate in the gray zone.
But wars can also arise through unplanned escalation,
miscalculation, and accident. China, Russia, India,
and other states are investing heavily in traditional

102

military capabilities. U.S. national security strategy
cannot proceed as if war is out of the question—only
that, when dealing with the intentional strategies of
leading powers, it will generally be dealing with gray
zone approaches.
If valid, this hypothesis would have significant implications. It suggests that the most common national
security threats will stem from gray zone initiatives
rather than traditional military aggression. It implies
that states are likely to invest more resources in the
tools that make gray zone campaigns possible, everything from elite direct action special operations forces
to social media capabilities and civilian coast guards.
It also suggests that greater emphasis and resources
should be devoted to developing concepts and doctrines tailored for gray zone environments.
HYPOTHESIS TWO: GRAY ZONE STRATEGIES
DEMAND A NEW THEORY OF CONFLICT
In the process, gray zone campaigns would also
seem to call for a new theory of conflict—a set of principles and theories of success in gray zone environments. As we are already seeing, the authors of gray
zone approaches hope to place defenders in challenging positions strewn with dilemmas. Responding in
traditional ways might not work, and can even be
counterproductive. Gray zone conflict must be understood in fundamentally different ways from major
warfare.
In major war, for example, classic doctrine holds
that success comes from focus, concentration, speed,
and decisiveness. The principles of gray zone conflict
will be very different. Sample operational principles
for success in the gray zone might include:

103

•	
The ultimate objectives of any campaign will derive from political interests and goals that will be
entirely contingent to the situation. The essential
purpose of any gray zone campaign is to create new political facts on the ground consonant
with the aggressing state’s interests. This principle is similar to Carl von Clausewitz’s classic
dictum that war serves political objectives, but
in a much more encompassing manner: Every
battlefield tactic must be conceived in political
terms.
•	
Success depends on remaining below key thresholds
that would bring the conflict into a different
realm. Patience is more important than rushing, if the risk is triggering a massively disproportionate reaction. As Russia discovered when
moving on from Crimea to Ukraine proper, the
cardinal sin in gray zone campaigns is becoming too ambitious. Once a campaign has triggered a disproportionate response, the advantage of the gray zone realm has been lost, and
the risks of escalation grow.
•	
Efforts must be coordinated to achieve effects greater
than the sum of their parts. Success in gray zone
campaigns is all about holistic effects. Again,
this is similar to concepts of combined arms
and joint operations, but, like the issue of politics, it extends the insight to its natural conclusion. It points to further development of crossboundary, interagency collaboration on gray
zone campaigns, a goal that remains elusive
within the U.S. Government.
•	
Defense leaders must rethink what is considered the
core or basic effort and what is considered an option or branch. Today, military planning focuses
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on the moment when conventional operations
begin—Phase III, in the current parlance. It is
the hub around which all efforts revolve. Other
places on the spectrum (either pre-war or postwar) are considered supporting branches of the
main effort. Increasingly in a gray zone world,
however, U.S. planners will need to take Phase
0 and Phase 1 activities seriously as the core
effort, with a large-scale Phase III operation
only emerging as a potential option if the gray
zone crisis escalates. This reinforces the lesson
that gray zone conflicts blur the boundaries
between military and civilian endeavors: Military operational planning will likely be forced
to give much greater attention to activities
and phases traditionally discounted, or left to
civilian agencies.
•	
In most cases, everything will depend on an effective narrative that becomes broadly accepted, at
least within target populations (which can be a
subset of a state). In classic military operations,
unconditional victories can be won by states
with bankrupt narratives. This will seldom be
the case in the gray zone.
•	
Gray zone campaigns will demand more ongoing
adaptation and experimentation. Planning for
conventional military operations is designed
to produce an effective force at the outset of a
war capable of winning the conflict in relatively
short order, using the concepts, doctrines, and
capabilities in place from the start. Adaptation
and innovation take place during every war, of
course. But in gray zone campaigns, the balance
between pre-existing approaches and adapted
ones may change significantly. Because of the
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wide range of tools engaged in the conflict, the
different forms and intensities it can take, and
the groping, ambiguous nature of gradual approaches, these campaigns will likely demand
a much higher degree of experimentation and
learning-by-doing. They will call for a greater
emphasis on innovation (both in concepts and
capabilities), rapid prototyping, and flexibility
in the basic strategy being employed.
•	In gray zone contests, success or failure will usually be a function of the relative social resilience
and vulnerabilities of the two sides. Rivals in gray
zone conflict will depend most of all on larger
strengths, weaknesses, and realities more than
the quality of the tools employed. As an example, when states have weaknesses in their
political unity, rivals can use that as the foundation to construct aggressive narratives and
destabilize the state.
As noted earlier, U.S. military operational doctrine
tends to focus on the major combat operations phase of
a conflict. U.S. Joint Operational Planning approaches
and procedures are all about getting to “Phase III” so
that the United States can “win” in traditional terms.
Yet, a major purpose of gray zone strategies is to ensure that, by the time Phase III kicks off, the enemy has
already lost. Their political situation, social cohesion,
ability to rally international support, logistical base,
battlefield awareness, and many other critical sources
of strength will be to atrophied that they will either
surrender to the gray zone aggressor’s political goals
short of major combat, or else collapse quickly when
it begins. In addition to studying the broad principles
of conflict in the gray zone as suggested earlier, there-
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fore, the U.S. Government should develop operational
doctrines for these other phases of conflict.
HYPOTHESIS THREE: GRAY ZONE
CAMPAIGNS GENERATE A SENSE OF
PERSISTENT WARFARE
By making it more difficult to recognize the difference between peace and war, gray zone strategies are
likely to foster a sense of relentless confrontation and
invite the perception in the capitals of major powers
that they are already at war with rivals or competitors.
This is increasingly the flavor, for example, of the U.S.
official dialogue on China, and becoming so of Russia
as well.
National leaders expect classic geopolitical competition, even among friends and, in some cases, allies.
States spy on one another, seek relative advantage in
trade deals, use cyber techniques to gather information (sometimes to benefit their domestic industries),
engage in industrial policy, and employ tariffs and
nontariff barriers to boost their economy, and much
more. In other words, they play at the “low intensity”
end of the gray zone conflict spectrum on a regular basis, without creating a sense of bellicose confrontation.
By moving the scale of competition toward the
right side of the spectrum, however, gray zone strategies risk replacing a sense of generally accepted levels
of competition with a bitter and mutually hostile environment. Spying and seeking economic advantage is
one thing; dispatching civilian fleets or covert infiltration units to generate persistent coercive pressure is a
very different proposition. Many countries in Eastern
Europe surely feel that Russia is at war with them today, and many U.S. national security officials believe
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the same about China. What this means is unclear, but
that is part of the character—and risk—of gray zone
approaches: Exactly what constitutes being “at war”
becomes something in the eye of the beholder. A continuous series of aggressive actions built around elaborate political claims will come to be seen as a war-like
campaign. State interpretations of others’ goals and
intentions may harden as all sides begin to view gray
zone activities as evidence of limitless revisionism.
Such a perception would lay the groundwork for
spirals of hostility, arms races, and other unstable outcomes. It might make it easier for states to make escalation decisions, since the perception will not be that
they are starting a war—only taking the next logical
step in one. Such heightened sense of conflict will also
make it less likely that competitive states would be
able to cooperate in areas where they genuinely share
mutual interests.
As noted in Chapter 5, washing away the line between peacetime and wartime will create significant
legal dilemmas for U.S. policy—a process that has
been well underway over the past 15 years. Both U.S.
and international law make important distinctions
between what is allowed in peace as opposed to wartime. The United States has stretched that distinction
during its war on terror, unilaterally determining itself to be at war in ways that the international community has not always accepted. If the pattern becomes
truly generalized—if gray zone campaigns make the
difference between peace and war almost moot—then
important legal restraints on state action could be lost.
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HYPOTHESIS FOUR: GRAY ZONE CONFLICT
INCREASES THE POTENTIAL FOR
INADVERTENT WAR
In one sense, the greater reliance on gray zone
strategies could be a hopeful trend in international
security: States adopting gray zone approaches have
chosen to avoid major war. In fact, these strategies
create a whole range of risks all their own. Given the
constraints suggested earlier, the most likely routes to
war are through misperception, accident, or miscalculation. Gradualist strategies set the stage for all three.
States may feel the ability to take greater risks with
gray zone tools, for example, convinced of their ability
to restrain escalation, only to find that specific actions,
or the sum of several gray zone tools, begins to push
the conflict up the escalatory ladder. Once a gray zone
campaign is underway, moreover, it is easy to imagine the collection of actions creating a siege mentality
on the part of the defender, leading to progressively
more violent forms of confrontation. Aggressors may
underestimate a defender’s willingness to hit back
and perhaps escalate in order to deter future meddling, thus sparking a spiral of conflict.2
In these and other ways, gray zone strategies are
invitations to misperception. When Thomas Schelling
discusses “the power to bind oneself,” he is looking
for strength in deterrent or reassuring promises by
making the realm of potential choice very limited in
a crisis. In a famous line, Schelling argued that “It is
essential, therefore, for maximum credibility, to leave
as little room as possible for judgment or discretion in
carrying out the threat.”3 The emphasis is on threats
that are credible, with specific, stated, or clearly implied objectives. Gray zone strategies are by definition
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ambiguous, with their goals and techniques masked
and often explicitly denied. What the author of the
strategies actually wants may not be clear—even to
them. They often leave equivocal the commitments in
play and, to some extent, even the national interests
involved.
Schelling’s discussion of the manipulation of risk
also highlights the dangers. In a bargaining situation,
either or both (or all) sides may use the risk of escalation as a coercive tool. It is the use of unpredictable
actions to create danger that makes countries want to
give in and step back from the brink. The question, he
argues, is usually not between “peace” and “war”—it
is whether one or both sides are willing to take some
risk with an undefined danger of war. “It is the essence of a crisis that the participants are not fully in
control of events,” he explains. Their mutual awareness of this fact contributes to the coercive power of
risk-taking. He specifically highlights limited war as
not merely a direct means to an end, but also an “action that enhances the risk of a greater war” and thus
a form of risk-taking coercion.4
The danger here, of course, is that misinterpreted
lessons from a contest of risk-taking could spiral into
wider conflict. There is a real risk, Schelling explains,
that “the other will genuinely misinterpret how far he
is invited to go. If one side yields on a series of issues,
when the matters at stake are not critical, it may be
difficult to communicate to the other just when a vital
issue has been reached.”5 This is precisely the danger
with gray zone strategies. If Russia can take 150 smallish steps toward the destabilization of Ukraine, it will
be exceedingly difficult to convey that the 151st might
cross some invisible threshold. The problem can also
become more fundamental: Britain and France had
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acceded to dozens of German provocations in the
years leading to 1939, and, by the time the Wehrmacht
massed to invade Poland, London and Paris’s insistence that they would respond this time fell on deaf
ears. Gray zone strategies can create an inherent and
inevitable lack of clarity on red lines that invites escalation and undermines deterrence.
Having been allowed to get away with many
gradual steps, a gray zone aggressor’s appetite may
be whetted. If progress bogs down, it may be more
likely to escalate than if never allowed to begin at all.
This may be part of the story with regard to Russia’s
actions in Ukraine, which flowed from a burst of confidence in the wake of the astonishingly successful
seizure of Crimea.
Viewed from the other side of the dispute, though,
the opposite dynamic can be equally dangerous: Having taken dozens of steps forward, a gray zone aggressor may walk itself into a perception of emergent
interests, and willingness to take further risk, that it
did not have to begin with. In the gray zone strategist’s own mind, the accumulation of small steps may
create, over time, what is to them a hard-and-fast commitment—one that is missed by a potential challenger
engaging in wishful thinking. (The incremental U.S.
commitment to the Vietnam War is one example of
how individual choices can accumulate to the point
where credibility is at stake.) Even if a challenger begins a process, assuming that they intend to remain
within the gray zone, the very aspect of such strategies that creates a dilemma for the defender—the
fact that, on its own, each step does not engage vital
interests—can lull the aggressor into taking so many
actions that they generate a situation of vital interests
for themselves. Once Russia has taken 100 gray zone
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actions toward Ukraine, for example, including the
publication of extensive political narratives justifying
its claims, it may have backed itself into a corner from
which it cannot withdraw. If the gray zone strategy
cannot generate success for its political objectives, it
may feel compelled to escalate.
Part of the danger stems from the fact that the authors of gray zone strategies do not see themselves
as aggressors. They believe that they are responding
to American and allied provocations. This self-perception creates a real risk is of a cycle of mutuallyescalating gradualist actions.
Eventually, the aggressor, if its campaign continues to expand, is likely to trip over some sort of an
escalatory threshold. The problem is that, in gray zone
campaigns even more so than traditional military
confrontations, neither side has a very good sense of
where precisely these thresholds are. If the victim of
the gradualist moves believes it has no good response
and risks being salami sliced to death, it may decide it
has no alternative but to escalate—and it might do so
fairly randomly, at a moment or on an issue that the
aggressor has no way to anticipate. It may be impossible to know in advance when the defender will reach
their point of intolerance, because the judgment is as
much subjective, political, and personality-driven as
it is rational and objective. Eventually, “someone is
likely to draw a red line somewhere,” Robert Haddick
has argued:
The issue for U.S. officials is whether they will be the
ones to do that drawing, and thus retain the initiative,
or whether someone else, having lost confidence in
Washington, will do it instead. When that happens,
the U.S. will find itself reacting to events, rather than
shaping a favorable outcome in advance.6
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The risk of escalation is magnified by the widespread use of proxies in gray zone strategies. Because
such campaigns often involve an integrated but not
fully coordinated network of paramilitary forces, civilian government agencies, hackers, propagandists,
allies and outright mercenaries, the initiator of gray
zone campaigns will seldom have full control over the
outcome. The natural tendencies toward friction in
conflict are magnified when the opposing forces are
not largely cohesive armies but somewhat arbitrary
grab-bags of actors, some of whom have little stake
in stability. The potential for state-sponsored but selfdirected organizations to generate escalatory spirals is
very real.
From a geopolitical standpoint, gray zone tactics
also risk escalation in part by complicating the task of
interpreting the intentions of rising powers. International relations literature has noted the challenges of
uncertainty in world politics, and specifically the difficulty of being sure about the intentions of others. This
is, in fact, the leading engine of instability in neorealism and, to some degree, in many other classic and recent variants of realist thought. It is precisely because
states cannot be certain about what others intend that
they feel the need to prepare for the worst, and generate security dilemmas.7 Such tactics also blur the lines
between status quo and revisionist powers. They can
allow a state to masquerade as a status quo power
while working energetically on a revisionist agenda.
Gray zone strategies target a weak spot of the selfenforcing aspect of the international system. A critical
norm is the unwillingness of most states to risk exclusion from the overall system with acts of such obvious
violence and aggression that they become outcasts. Interests dictate otherwise. But the precise vulnerability

113

of the international system is the thinness of its regulatory architecture: Whereas on the domestic front, a
“gradualist” approach to overthrowing one’s neighbor might quickly run afoul of the dense network of
laws and regulations governing interactions of citizens
(running afoul, for example, of harassment or trespassing laws or building codes), on the international scene
the legal network is far less well-established. Adventurists can get away with a lot more before they hit
the tripwire of the self-enforced cooperative security
that reflects shared interests. Put into the language of
international relations theory, it is more difficult for
classic balancing dynamics to operate when members
of the system cannot decide whether a state needs to
be balanced at all.
One reason states hesitate to take the revisionist
route is that revisionism generates reactions and can
be self-defeating. Gray zone strategies, in effect, split
the difference, and make it difficult for anyone—even
officials in the aggressive state itself—to know if its
agenda is truly revisionist or not. Incremental moves
adopted as part of a gray zone strategy create a sort of
ongoing game in which each side must decide whether
to continue to play—to take more moves, to escalate,
or step back. If the established power believes that the
challengers have limited aims, the best course is to appease; if they are a new Hitler, with boundless goals,
the established power should stand fast. Such uncertainty over the challenger’s real intentions confront
the established power with a large and ongoing dilemma: “The earlier the declining state draws the line,
the stronger it is, and the higher its expected payoff in
the event of war. But the earlier it draws the line, the
higher the probability of an unnecessary war.”8
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HYPOTHESIS FIVE: GRAY ZONE CAMPAIGNS
UNDERMINE DETERRENCE
Over time, a major risk of gray zone campaigns is
that they could dissolve the credibility of U.S. commitments and deterrent threats. Indeed, this is, to
some degree, the conscious intent of the authors of
such strategies. Beyond the progress achieved toward
political goals, with each small step that goes unpunished and unreversed, a revisionist lays more seeds
of doubt that the United States (or others) would
respond to something bigger.9
This effect can occur because gray zone campaigns
disrupt the basic action-reaction dynamic of game
theoretic approaches to rivalry and deterrence. The
assumption of such theories is that two (or more) sides
interact through relatively clear signals of their interests and intent, and that both sides are playing on a
chessboard where interests and risks are objectively
available. Russia knows, for example, that the Baltic
states are North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
members and understands the U.S. commitment to
Article V of the Alliance; NATO can further signal
intent via a number of actions. In theoretical terms,
a good example of available preferences as a guide
to interactive choice is the prisoner’s dilemma: The
assumed players can see the lineup of rewards.
Gray zone strategies complicate this process and
raise ambiguities at many levels of signaling and deterrence. Just what intent may be at stake is not always
clear, because there can be a wide gulf between the
importance of one step in a gradualist chain and the
ultimate effect of the whole series. States intentionally conceal their intentions in gray zone campaigns,
meaning that it is difficult, if not impossible, to reli-
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ably read the goals of other actors into the situation.
In short, gray zone strategies interrupt the process
of accurately conveying intentions, making strategic
interactions far more fluid and ambiguous.
At the same time, by generating a long series of
actions that do not very often spark effective countermoves, gray zone strategies can undermine deterrence more directly, by ruining the confidence that the
defender will act. As two scholars have argued:
The second way deterrence can fail is gradual, through
a chipping-away at the credibility of the leading power in the system. . . . [O]ne of the parties is intentionally seeking to readjust the status quo undergirded by
deterrence by means of a gradual alteration of expectations and credibility. The revisionist side wants to
engender a gradual failure of deterrence because it
considers the existing geopolitical order not to be attuned to its interests or prestige. . . . The objective is to
alter in a steady and almost stealthy way the expectations of future behavior that keep deterrence alive.
That is, the revisionist power wants to make all parties involved—the rival as well as his allies—believe
present promises of behavior will not be honored in
the future. Once such a belief sets in, the options for
the targeted powers are limited to accepting the new
geopolitical reality or restoring the status quo ante. In
either case, deterrence has failed—not violently, but in
the realm of perceptions and expectations.10

Thomas Schelling’s classic discussion of signaling
and credibility emphasized the danger that small violations of deterrent threats could snowball. The reason why the United States had to defend California,
he argued—apart from its intrinsic value—was that
the United States could not surrender California and
sustain its pledge to defend Oregon or Florida. “Once
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they [the aggressors] cross a line into a new class of
aggression,” he argued, “into a set of areas or assets
that we always claimed we would protect, we may
even deceive them if we do not react vigorously.”11 Yet
gray zone strategies can create precisely such a situation, in which the aggressor is allowed to “cross lines
into new classes of aggression” because the campaign
is so cleverly designed that no single step provides an
opportunity to “react vigorously.”
The danger, then, is not merely to a specific deterrent pledge or bilateral relationship—it is to the
structure of the rules-based order in general, and the
credibility of U.S. and allied power that underpins
that order. We can see the first hints of this in Eastern
Europe today, for example, with the widely-held perception that Russia has been able to wage a version
of war against neighboring states without being decisively confronted. This perception is exaggerated—as
we have seen, Russia has paid a significant price for
its gray zone adventurism. But to the degree that other
potential aggressors believe that it has succeeded, the
credibility of U.S. deterrent threats in other theaters,
especially in relation to gray zone aggression, will
decline.
A particular challenge in terms of the effects of
gray zone aggression on credibility is that the United
States will not recognize the threat for what it is until
too late. If Iran were to launch a war of aggression in
the Persian Gulf, the implications of a failure to respond would be obvious. (Indeed, the risks of such
failures can be much more obvious once aggression
has occurred rather than beforehand—a phenomenon
we see in the Korean War and other cases.) The costs of
not responding for the future of U.S. credibility will be
fairly obvious. But if Iran takes 50 gradual gray zone
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actions to undermine its neighbors, the dangers to U.S.
credibility of any one action—or any five or 10—will
be masked. This will continue until the actions reach
some critical mass, at which point the injury to the
reliability of U.S. promises might be irrecoverable.
HYPOTHESIS SIX: GRAY ZONE CONFLICT
DEPENDS UPON LARGER SOCIAL, POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC FACTORS FOR SUCCESS
OR FAILURE
The idea that war serves political objectives is
hardly new. But while the operations of major combat
serve political ends and are meaningless absent some
higher political goal, the day-to-day operations of
traditional military campaigns are themselves somewhat independent of the political sphere. The success
or failure of the Union Army at Gettysburg, PA, had
huge political ramifications, but success or failure on
that battlefield had everything to do with military
operational decisions that were isolated from the
larger context.
In gray zone conflict, there is no such segmentation. The outcomes of gray zone conflicts will seldom be determined by the operations or campaigns
themselves—they will be the product of larger forces.
Russia’s success (or failure) in its various campaigns
has been a product of local social and political factors
more than the skill or resources involved in its own
operations. Indeed, gray zone techniques can properly be thought of tools to take advantage of pre-existing political, social, or economic vulnerabilities rather
than as efforts capable of achieving decisive results on
their own.
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Mark Galeotti refers to the failure of Russia to undermine Ukraine as a whole and suggests that “the
military is purely part of a political campaign, and
that has been a disastrous failure.” Authors of gray
zone campaigns, he urges, must keep in mind that
success “depends above all on a clear and accurate
understanding of the political context in which it will
operate.” The whole point of gray zone campaigns is
that their “diverse components must be effectively
combined to win the underlying ‘political war’ to
achieve the desired aim.”12 The openness of the current Russian economy makes Moscow vulnerable to
being alienated from global trading and capital markets. It cannot prolong an endless gray zone campaign
is the result is that Russia is alienated from the world
economy.
From the standpoint of defending against these
strategies, Phillip Karber emphasizes the importance
of denying gray zone aggressors the social and political leverage points they use to fracture the stability of their targets. In Eastern Europe, for example, he
stresses the importance of providing ethnic Russian
minorities with a strong stake in the societies, and
eliminating the official corruption on which gray zone
infiltration tactics can feed.13
A powerful example of these lessons can be drawn
from the Cold War. The Soviet Union threw every
manner of gray zone weapon at the West in the form
of its active measures, and none did serious damage.
This was not due to the lack of sophistication of those
campaigns, or the resources or commitment invested
in them. It was a product, quite simply, of the ultimate
truth of the Cold War: The Western socioeconomic
system was stronger, and long-term trends favored
the West. Mutual gray zone harassment was destined
to have a much greater effect on the Soviet Union
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because of the inherent vulnerabilities of its system
and the relative robustness of liberal democracy. Responding to gray zone campaigns is all about enhancing the political resilience of the target state.
This was George Kennan’s greatest insight. The
West would win the Cold War, he believed, because
of its social and economic, not military, superiority.
The goal of its military and geostrategic efforts was
merely to avoid defeat, keep the Communist world
from gaining a false sense of momentum through conquest, and wait for history’s persistent energies to do
their work. Our task is much the same with gray zone
strategies today.
As suggested earlier, gray zone tactics are often the
strategy of the weak, not the strong. They allow states
like Russia and Iran—otherwise being bowled over by
the tide of history—to find avenues to exercise power and pursue their regional ambitions. The key for
the United States, then, is not so much to become the
world master of gray zone tactics on the small scale.
It is to attend to the big picture and ensure that larger
trends work to the U.S. advantage.
HYPOTHESIS SEVEN: GRAY ZONE CAMPAIGNS
HAVE POWERFUL LIMITATIONS
Some of the recent literature on gray zone techniques has an urgent or even defeatist tone, implying
that these techniques provide huge advantages to revisionists determined to undermine U.S. power and
gain relative advantage. This analysis has conveyed
some of the opportunities reflected in such strategies.
But, as I argued earlier, it is also important to appreciate their limitations—ways in which gray zone strategies reflect something well short of a magic wand of
geopolitical advantage.
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The most obvious limitation is suggested by the
preceding hypothesis. Gray zone strategies allow
states to capitalize on others’ vulnerabilities, but they
seldom, if ever, offer avenues to achieve decisive results on their own. Beijing cannot be certain of achieving its ultimate goals in the South China Sea through
gradual gray zone tactics and techniques alone. If others resist sufficiently, China will ultimately need to
decide whether to escalate to more elaborate forms of
aggression.
For all the recent analysis of gray zone conflicts,
for example, there is little evidence that such activities can have conclusive results on their own. Neither
the U.S. nor Soviet Cold War-era gray zone efforts
appear to have been decisive. (Certainly, the Soviet
active measures campaign achieved little of note.) It
remains unclear how much China will achieve with its
campaign in the South China Sea. Russia’s successful
grab of Crimea may count as more of a quasi-military
fait accompli rather than a true gray zone campaign.
In short, further research is needed to understand the
experience of gray zone strategies.
Just as the defenders in gray zone campaigns face
certain dilemmas, so do the aggressors. The more aggressive they are, the more forceful the instruments
they employ, the more likely they are to achieve the
coercive leverage needed to achieve their objectives.
But the higher the degree of force involved, the more
likely the gray zone strategist is to provoke a more
elaborate response. Galeotti has emphasized the ways
in which Russia’s campaigns in Ukraine have shown
both the potential for and limits of gray zone strategies. The major price paid by Russia due to its operations in Ukraine shows that “this is by no means the
guaranteed war-winner some had initially assumed.”
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Ukraine’s resistance hardened, the West imposed
severe sanctions, and the campaign went from the
intended goal of a short, quick win to a “bleeding
wound”14 that is sapping Russian strength.
In sum, gray zone strategies are not magic wands.
They have significant limitations and will be challenging to employ effectively. Their advantage over major
warfare is also the source of their weakness: They do
not represent strategies capable of achieving decisive
outcomes within a defined period of time. States may
find great challenges in attempting to achieve defined
political objectives reliably with such approaches.
CONCLUSION
These seven hypotheses offer ways of understanding aspects of this emerging form of conflict, perhaps
the default means by which measured revisionists
(and others) will pursue their political goals in ways
more aggressive than classic diplomacy. While the true
role of gray zone strategies in world politics remains
to be seen, there is at least the potential for it to play
a central role in state rivalry in the coming decades,
despite its distinct limitations. What remains is to discuss ways in which the United States and its friends
and allies can deal with this potential technique, and
even use it to their relative advantage.
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10. Ibid.
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CHAPTER 8
STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH
GRADUALIST CHALLENGES
Responding to gray zone strategies is inherently
challenging for the United States, and indeed for any
democracy. Competing successfully in this arena demands commitment to steady, coherent, long-term
strategies. In some cases, as in responding to clandestine proxy wars, it can require operating in the
shadows and taking actions that cannot be publicly
acknowledged. It demands an effort to manage narratives in a manner that pushes up against the constraints of democratic policymaking. The United States
managed to achieve all of these goals during the Cold
War, but, in general, they do not accord well with the
typically short-term, absolutist cast of U.S. national
security planning.
This is not to suggest that the United States has no
tools in its arsenal for such conflicts. In fact, it ought
to be able to defend itself and its allies from gray zone
aggression perfectly well. Doing so demands integrated strategies that span multiple administrations,
but this has been possible in the past. The needed investments are modest, especially because, as Chapter
7 suggested, gray zone strategies are somewhat selflimiting. I will suggest a number of specific capabilities that could be helpful in the tactical back-and-forth
of gray zone conflict.
An overarching priority of these steps is to provide
senior leaders in the U.S. National Command Authority with a wider range of nuanced options. When
confronting gray zone campaigns today, U.S. leaders
often confront a typical array of tools not necessarily

125

optimized for gray zone contexts—and not always
flexible or tailored to such circumstances. A main
priority of any new approach should be to integrate
a broad array of potential actions, from long-term
work on institutions to immediate responses on the local battlefield, into coherent operational concepts for
fighting in the gray zone. U.S. leaders should have a
deep and extensive menu of response options for such
situations.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Yet, the most fundamental response to this challenge is not to become tactically brilliant in the gray
zone—it is to render the zone mostly moot, and take
advantage of the inherent limitations and dilemmas
involved in the employment of such strategies. These
recommendations focus on geopolitical rather than
military operational elements. They point to ways of
shaping long-term trends in order to render the United States less vulnerable to gray zone disruption.
1. Set the Long-Term Trajectory: Make Sure Time
is On Your Side. The fundamental response to gray
zone strategies is not to combat them directly, but
rather to set the conditions so that long-term social,
political, and economic trends favor the United States,
its allies and friends, and the stability of the rulesbased order. Gray zone strategies prey upon weaknesses and vulnerabilities in these areas. Addressing
such potential danger zones is the first step toward
becoming more resilient.
The U.S. grand strategy has been built—at least
since 1945, in some sense from the very founding of
the nation—on the central concept that time was on the
side of the American experiment. The central Ameri-
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can narrative, and foundation of U.S. grand strategy,
is that liberal democracy is destined to triumph over
competing ideologies. It was this essential faith that
sustained U.S. administrations and generations during the Cold War, and it remains the basic answer to
the gray zone campaigns of revisionists today.
The United States could pursue this goal in two
broad and complementary ways. One would focus
on international and external trends and institutions;
one on domestic and internal issues. Internationally,
the United States could work to reinforce elements of
the rules-based international order that has helped to
keep the peace for over 60 years. This approach must
evolve, however, to multilateralize the governance of
these institutions in important new ways, to open the
running of the rules-based order to any responsible
state. The United States can use a flexible set of norms
and institutions to absorb and normalize the more
constrained measured revisionism of rising states like
Brazil, Turkey, and India.
Providing democratic, peaceful, and constructive
quasi-revisionists with a stake in the system is critical
to preserving the overall balance of order and preventing more aggressive revisionists like China and Russia with the opportunity to gather fellow-travelers to
some alternative vision of the future system. This does
not imply recruiting some of these states as “allies”;
none of them has any interest in such a designation. It
merely means creating a more shared sense of international ownership of rules, norms, and institutions
so that long-term trends can reflect deepened order
and strengthened consensus against belligerence. It is
a strategy of endorsing partial revisionism to discredit
more radical varieties.
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Such an approach would build on the idea that, despite their seeming energy and momentum, measured
revisionists are operating from a position of weakness.
Their bellicosity is ultimately self-defeating—as much
so with gray zone aggression as anything else. China’s
campaign of territorial aggrandizement in the South
China Sea has provoked a fairly significant regional
response, for example, given that no shots have been
fired. Japan’s new defense guidance alone and the
tighter partnership it implies with the United States
has probably cost China more in the overall balance
of power than it has gained with its rhetoric and land
reclamation. U.S. relations with Japan, Vietnam, the
Philippines, and other victims of China’s over-reaching have been growing.1 Russia’s even more belligerent gray zone aggression in Ukraine has generated
economic sanctions and geopolitical isolation. Truly
disruptive revisionism is a dead-end road, and U.S.
efforts to manage the future of the rules-based order
can build on these natural dynamics and reinforce this
lesson. The goal of a strengthened, multilateralized
emphasis on norms and institutions is, in part, to create processes and norms that such generate negative
feedback.
The second approach to making time work for the
United States is the oft-repeated requirement to attend
to issues of domestic social and economic strength,
from entitlement and tax reform to measures to ease
inequality to infrastructure investments and much
more. Beyond the United States, socio-economic tension and instability is a key sign of potential vulnerability to gray zone tactics. Russia has been able to
gain a foothold in neighboring countries with restive Russian-speaking populations; unhappy, quasiindependent provinces; and weak or corrupt local or
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central governments.2 Helping Russia’s neighbors to
become more stable and well-governed should be a
major U.S. focus in responding to gray zone tactics.
Finally, the success of U.S. responses to gray zone
aggression will depend in significant measure on
whether they are integrated into coherent regional
strategies. U.S. success in countering China’s South
China Sea gray zone approaches will be a function of
the degree to which it has an effective larger approach
to deal with the growth of Chinese power and foster
regional stability. Washington could develop potent
capabilities to counter the tactical effects of gray zone
campaigns and still fail if its general strategy is ineffectual. This is another example of the multiple ways
in which gray zone campaigns must be seen as one
piece of a more comprehensive picture: Setting the
largest context will be as important to dealing with
these challenges as any direct response.
2. Strengthen Institutions and Norms to Control
Revisionist Tactics. A related but independent response to gray zone aggression is to build or enhance
specific norms or institutions designed to reduce the
impact or escalatory potential of gray zone tools and
techniques.
One example of such norm- and institution-building would be to develop and expand confidencebuilding and crisis resolution mechanisms, such as
processes to enhance transparency at the regional or
issue level.3 One analyst has suggested an expansion
of military-to-military contacts, expanded mechanisms for information sharing among partner fleets
and militaries, and a more formal system for sharing
real-time maritime intelligence.4
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Beyond transparency and awareness, the United
States could work with allies to build codified norms
and rules that constrain gray zone adventurism and
improve predictability. So far, China has been reluctant to move past informal promises to resolve conflicts peacefully to more elaborate and formalized
rules for dispute resolution. The United States could
sponsor a new round of dialogues on such initiatives.
Globally, it could pursue such ideas as a convention
for “cyber rules of the road” that would have the effect of limiting the use of cyber aggression as part of
any gray zone campaign. In the process, the United
States can build on its status as “partner of choice” to
help convene various institutional responses to potential gray zone instability.5
Such ideas would also seem tailor-made for parallel Track 2 initiatives, privately funded and engaging researchers in all the regional countries to create
a shared historical database and real-time picture of
incremental moves throughout the region. These initiatives could take advantage of a number of areas of
advancing technology, from grassroots social media
reporting to track events to publicly-available civilian
imagery.
A particular form of confidence-building mechanism is intensely human, and will be essential in a
period of constant rivalry and gray zone conflict: Nurturing leader-to-leader relationships. Nadia Schadlow
has emphasized the importance of basic relationship
management in the effort to deal with gray zone
conflict.6 Being able to pick up the phone and call a
counterpart during a crisis is an essential element of
dispute resolution, and yet the practice of building
strong personal relationships among senior officials
has somewhat fallen out of favor. It will be increas-
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ingly important in the fluid, unpredictable world of
gray zone campaigns.
3. Decide Where Accommodation Is Possible.
Not every tool for responding to gray zone aggression
must be confrontational. Measured revisionists ultimately desire recognition and stable prosperity. They
do not intend to undermine the international system
as a whole, and do not, at this point, nourish the hope
of sending tank divisions or fleets to seize neighboring
territories. It ought to be possible to avoid escalating
rounds of gray zone conflict through accommodation.
Accommodation has a negative connotation today,
as it is too often equated with appeasement. But great
powers must accommodate their mutual interests all
the time, and this is no less true—and arguably even
more so—at a time of mounting rivalry. Not all gradual efforts to gain influence by other powers must be resisted, and there may be a worthwhile larger dialogue
about concessions or negotiations in the name of collective security. The idea is in part to use a measured
revisionist’s willingness to work gradually to sidestep risks of conflict in the short term, while granting
some of their goals.
A good example of the soft-line foundation for
responding to gray zone pressure may be Vietnam’s
response to China. It is grounded in a confidence that
the two countries share many interests and, despite
their occasional conflicts, that Vietnam ought to be
able to work its substantial contacts in the Chinese
Communist Party in order to resolve key disputes.7
But it also seems based on a willingness to grant fundamental Chinese interests and not view the competition as a zero-sum game. Accommodation becomes
more feasible if, as suggested earlier, the United States
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has confidence that, due to a combination of strategic realities and U.S. policy, time is on the side of the
United States. Such a thought process again goes back
to the Cold War, and George Kennan’s view—as indeed it was, in different ways, Richard Nixon’s and
Ronald Reagan’s—that when long-term trends were
working in America’s favor, compromise made sense
in the name of keeping the peace.8
A good example can be found in Europe today. Few
could make the case that long-term trends are favoring
Russian power vis-à-vis Europe or the United States.
Russia’s economy is troubled, it faces a demographic
collapse and confronts long-term ecological issues.
Now Moscow has incurred a serious economic price in
the form of the sanctions imposed in retaliation for its
aggression in Ukraine. The United States and its European partners should operate from the view that the
long-term will be favorable to their interests relative
to Russia’s—and that this opens the way to accommodations to prevent escalation of conflict in the shortterm. Granting Russia certain concessions regarding
its self-defined regional security imperatives could
make it less reliant on gray zone campaigns without
threatening long-term Western goals.
4. Build Forces, Systems, Technologies, Concepts, and Doctrines for a Gradualist Environment.
In addition to these broad geostrategic context-setting
actions, the United States should also seek to develop
specific capabilities optimized for gray zone conflict.
There is evidence that the most effective gray zone
campaigns are holistic, integrated approaches that
knit together the effects of many different instruments
of power. Improving U.S. capabilities for such campaigns thus requires investments in and attention to a
wide range of tools and techniques.
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To begin with, the United States should build concepts of operations for gray zone conflicts, broad theories of success and planned approaches for employing a range of tools for combined effect. Gray zone
campaigns are complex, integrated endeavors, and
stumbling into one without a clear sense of how one
intends to employ available tools is a prescription for
failure. The biggest challenge may be institutional: Deciding what office should develop these concepts. The
dilemma is that the military has the most experience
with such concept development, but gray zone campaigns are dominantly nonmilitary in nature. Perhaps
this calls for a small new office, housed in the State
Department or National Security Council, including
detailed military officers, civilian experts in other instruments of power, and scholars in the application of
coercive diplomacy.
As a general rule, investments in gray zone capabilities ought to cover a wide range of tools. Dominance in any one area is likely to be less important
than baseline capabilities in many mutually supporting ones. In general, high-end scenarios suggest the
need for quality at the expense of quantity: relatively
few high-tech systems that can provide dominant battlefield capabilities. Gray zone conflict typically calls
for a wide range of tools.9
In terms of specific categories of investment, the
descriptions discussed earlier give a good sense of the
sorts of areas in which the United States ought to invest. In the information realm, the United States will
want improved versions of its current, largely experimental projects to use social media, official content,
and other streams of information to shape evolving
narratives. In the economic realm, U.S. strategists
could perhaps benefit from a more explicit and inten-
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sively designed set of options from financial sanctions
to anti-corruption strategies to targeted economic
assistance. At the higher end of the spectrum, it will
want relatively small but dedicated social operations
and covert action units uniquely trained for gray zone
contexts, likely including regionally-aligned special
operations forces with world-class language skills and
local socio-political awareness. For maritime environments, the United States will want a better balance
between its military and nonmilitary capabilities—
suggesting a greater relative investment in the Coast
Guard and in medical and humanitarian capabilities.
This is only a suggestive list.
As important as any collection of specific capabilities, however, will be a structure and process designed
to meld them together into holistic campaigns—and
to do so over very long periods of time. It will not be
enough to trust that the interagency system will generate effective strategies. Especially because of the
multidisciplinary nature of gray zone campaigns, that
outcome is unlikely. As problematic as it is to propose yet another structural fix, it may be necessary to
create a special office—perhaps at the National Security Council staff, or perhaps within the State Department—to manage the conduct of such campaigns and
draw together these various instruments in productive ways and over the long term.
5. Punish Selected Revisionist Acts and Broadcast True Red Lines. Finally, research on dealing with
incremental efforts to undermine established orders,
strategies such as faits accompli, suggests the importance of two related responses: Pointed action to punish overly aggressive revisionism, and broadcasting
clear red lines for truly vital interests.
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In service of the first goal, noticeable punishments
must be imposed on an aggressor who flouts international norms with their gray zone revisionism. The
United States and its allies can build cost-imposing
strategies to render gray zone campaigns toxic drains
on resources and reputation. One example might be
a covert campaign to strengthen Ukrainian militias
fighting Russian proxies. “By turning what Moscow
had hoped would be a quick limited war into a prolonged war of attrition,” two scholars suggest, “it
would be clear that revising the existing order by force
is not cost-effective. The salami slicing, so to speak,
would be halted and the hand holding the knife
rapped across the knuckles.”10
The basic concept behind such approaches would
be to build engines of negative feedback for aggressive revisionist acts, which create cost-imposing dynamics that make these self-limiting and declining
techniques. As Thomas Schelling has argued:
When the act to be deterred is inherently a sequence of
steps whose cumulative effect is what matters, a threat
geared to the increments may be more credible than
one that must be carried out either all at once or not
at all when some particular point has been reached. It
may even be impossible to define a ‘critical point’ with
sufficient clarity to be persuasive.11

Put in the plain language for which Schelling is
justly revered, the essay continues: “The man who
would kick a dog should be threatened with modest punishment for each step toward the dog, even
though his proximity is of no interest in itself.”12 U.S.
strategists need to develop a similar expectation of
action-reaction dynamics for gray zone conflicts, to
make clear to potential aggressors that they will pay a
135

specific price for each of their incremental steps—and
that there are red lines which will trigger much more
substantial escalation.
In this context, Schelling argues for a sort of muscular gradualism. A threat, to be made more credible,
“can be decomposed into a series of consecutive smaller threats,” giving the deterring state “an opportunity
to demonstrate on the first few transgressions that the
threat will be carried out on the rest.”13 He gives the
example of a desire to get reforms on an aid recipient’s policies. Cancelling all aid may be too difficult,
and counterproductive. So an aid donor might make a
series of small threats, to cancel individual programs
or grants, and in fulfilling them build leverage to get
its larger wishes granted.
This is the crux of the challenge, however—the political price for punishing these small steps seems very
high to many U.S. friends and allies. This is a dilemma
measured revisionism creates. However, the fact is
that the more the revisionists push, the stronger the
balancing becomes—a trend we see today in Europe
and Asia with the reactions to Russian and Chinese
revisionist muscle-flexing.14 U.S. policy can build on
this dynamic to create even more potent examples of
coercive reactions to gray zone aggression.
An important requirement for such approaches
is to look for and use moments when the gray zone
aggressor overreaches. A central component of gray
zone responses is to build up a gradual contrary portrait of the author of the campaign as an irresponsible
and dangerous violator of international norms. When
a gray zone campaign generates unplanned tension—
as when a maritime clash results in fatalities, or a
low-level commander goes too far, or paramilitary operations intended to remain secret are unveiled—the
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United States can use the momentary anger to achieve
specific objectives in its own countergray zone campaign. It can align coalitions against the aggressors,
try to put formalized rules of the road on the books,
pull targeted states away from aggressors’ economic
inducements, and more. The idea is, over time, to use
excessive steps to place a spotlight on the overall campaigns so as to complicate the efforts of the gray zone
strategists to achieve long-term progress.
In the process, a second critical requirement is to
make true red lines clear—and enforce them. Daniel
Altman has argued in relation to faits accompli that:
More often than not, the best option available to a state
confronting this problem is to rely on a strong red line
set on a focal point to encapsulate many small units
of value that this state cannot credibly threaten to defend individually. Knowing it cannot mount a credible defense after abandoning this red line, that point
becomes one from which it cannot retreat without
greater cost.15

He argues that Cold War tensions eased when the two
sides developed a partly de facto set of clear red lines
(in places like the inter-Korean border) that rules out a
continual series of faits accomplis.
This range of alternatives could offer a basic framework for dealing with gray zone revisionism. The most
important requirement, however, is to understand and
take seriously gray zone conflict as a distinct category
of state action. This monograph represents a first step
toward a more comprehensive understanding of gray
zone conflict. As noted at the outset, it is far from the
last word. Its goal is to provoke more discussion and
thinking about a strategic challenge that is likely to
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continue confronting the United States and its friends
and allies in the years ahead.
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